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Overview 
The committee's inquiry has spanned 15 months. During that time, the committee 
received much evidence highlighting the need for urgent and comprehensive reform of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) including 
substantial comment on the matter of mandatory data retention. During the later stages 
of the committee's inquiry, the government announced that it would be introducing a 
mandatory telecommunications data retention regime. 
Although the issues of comprehensive reform of the TIA Act and mandatory data 
retention are not mutually exclusive, to the extent possible, they have been considered 
separately to ensure that adequate consideration is given to both matters. 
This majority consensus report details the need for reform of the existing TIA Act.  
Separate additional remarks on the matters of data access and data retention are 
provided by the committee Chair, the government members of the committee and the 
opposition members of the committee. 
2  
 
 
 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The referral 
1.1 On 12 December 2013, the Senate referred the following matter to the Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee for inquiry and report by 
10 June 2014: 
Comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act), with regard to: 
a) the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission For 
Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice report, dated 
May 2008, particularly recommendation 71.2; and 
b) recommendations relating to the Act from the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security Inquiry into the potential 
reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation report, dated 
May 2013.
1
  
1.2 The Senate later extended the reporting date – to 27 August 2014, 29 October 
2014, 3 December 2014, 12 February 2015 and 18 March 2015.
2
  As a result of the 
introduction of the Abbott Government's Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 and its referral to the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) for inquiry and report by 27 
February 2015, the Senate again extended the reporting date of the inquiry to enable 
the committee to consider the government’s proposed data retention policy and the 
findings of the PJCIS.
3
  
Background to the terms of reference 
1.3 As the terms of reference indicate, the committee was required to 
comprehensively review the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
(TIA Act) having regard to recommendations made by two other bodies—the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its report, For Your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice, and the PJCIS, in its report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security Legislation. These earlier inquiries 
are briefly discussed below. 
                                              
1  Journals of the Senate, 12 December 2013, p. 373. 
2  Journals of the Senate, 14 May 2014, p. 793; Journals of the Senate, 27 August 2014, p. 1318; 
Journals of the Senate, 29 October 2014, p. 1673; Journals of the Senate, 1 December 2014, 
p. 1917; and Journals of the Senate, 12 February 2015, p. 2159. 
3  Journals of the Senate, 18 March 2015, p. 2320. 
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The Australian Law Reform Commission—For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice 
1.4 On 30 January 2006, the then Attorney-General, the Hon Philip Ruddock MP, 
referred 'matters relating to the extent to which the Privacy Act 1988 and related laws 
continue to provide an effective framework for the protection of privacy in Australia' 
to the ALRC for inquiry and report.
4
 In referring the matter, the Attorney-General 
requested that, among other things, the ALRC have regard to: 
 the rapid advances in information, communication, storage, 
surveillance and other relevant technologies; 
 possible changing community perceptions of privacy and the extent to 
which it should be protected by legislation; and 
 emerging areas that may require privacy protection.5  
1.5 The  ALRC  presented  its  report, titled 'For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice',  on  30  May  2008  making 295 recommendations. The 
primary focus of the ALRC's report was information privacy,
6
 however, the issue of 
privacy and telecommunications
7
 was considered in Part J of its report. In Part J the 
ALRC acknowledged 'the need for telecommunications regulation to respond to a 
convergent communications environment'
8
 but noted that as issues relating to 
convergence were beyond the scope of its terms of reference they should be 
considered separately. To that end, in recommendation 71.2 the ALRC called for a 
review of telecommunications legislation. Recommendation 71.2 reads as follows: 
The Australian Government should initiate a review to consider whether the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) and the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) continue to be effective in light of 
technological developments (including technological convergence), 
changes in the structure of communication industries and changing 
community perceptions and expectations about communication 
technologies. In particular, the review should consider: 
                                              
4  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), For your information: Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice, May 2008, p. 19. 
5  ALRC, For your information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, May 2008, p. 19. 
6  Information privacy involves the establishment of rules governing the collection and handling 
of personal data such as credit information, and medical and government records. It is also 
known as 'data protection'. See: ALRC, For your information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, May 2008, p. 142. 
7  Privacy of communications covers the security and privacy of mail, telephones, email and other 
forms of communication. See: ALRC, For your information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, May 2008, p. 142. 
8  ALRC, For your information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, May 2008, p. 2392. 
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(a) whether the Acts continue to regulate effectively communication technologies 
and the individuals and organisations that supply communication technologies 
and communication services; 
(b) how these two Acts interact with each other and with other legislation; 
(c) the extent to which the activities regulated under the Acts should be regulated 
under general communications legislation or other legislation; 
(d) the roles and functions of the various bodies currently involved in the 
regulation of the telecommunications industry, including the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, the Attorney-General’s Department, 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman, and Communications Alliance; and 
(e) whether the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act should be 
amended to provide for the role of a public interest monitor.
9
  
1.6 The Rudd Labor Government released its first stage response to the ALRC's 
report on 14 August 2009. The response committed the government to first reforming 
the 'privacy foundations' and to enhancing the role of the Privacy Commissioner.
10
 
Reform would be 'technology neutral' to ensure the protection of personal information 
held in any medium.
11
 Although the first stage response addressed 197 of the ALRC's 
295 recommendations, it did not address the matters set out in recommendation 71.2 
or broader issues relating to reform of the TIA Act. Rather, the government stated that 
it would consider the remaining recommendations of the ALRC after the first stage 
                                              
9  See: ALRC, For your information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, May 2008, p. 2395. 
10  In the response, the government committed to: creating a harmonised set of Privacy Principles; 
redrafting and updating the Privacy Principles; creating a comprehensive credit reporting 
framework; improving health sector information flows, and giving individuals new rights to 
control their health records, contributing to better health service delivery; requiring the public 
and private sector to ensure the right to privacy will continue to be protected if personal 
information is sent overseas; and strengthening the Privacy Commissioner's powers to conduct 
investigations, resolve complaints and promote compliance, contributing to more effective and 
stronger protection of the right to privacy. Source: Australian Government, Enhancing National 
Privacy Protection, Australian Government First Stage Response to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Report 108. October 2009. See: 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf (accessed 
25 March 2014). 
11  Source: Australian Government, Enhancing National Privacy Protection, Australian 
Government First Stage Response to the Australian Law Reform Commission Report 108. 
October 2009. See: http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf 
(accessed 25 March 2014). 
6  
 
response reforms had progressed. Legislation giving effect to the government's first 
stage response was enacted in November 2012.
12
  
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security—Inquiry into 
potential reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation 
1.7 In May 2012, the then Attorney-General (the Hon Nicola Roxon MP) 
requested that the PJCIS conduct an inquiry into a package of potential reforms to 
Australia's national security legislation. The package of reforms put to the PJCIS was 
comprised of 'telecommunications interception reform, telecommunications sector 
security reform and Australian intelligence community reform'.
13
  Along with the 
referral of the PJCIS inquiry, the Attorney-General's Department (the department) 
released a discussion paper that canvassed issues covered by the ALRC's report, 
including matters set out in Part J (which, as noted above, included recommendation 
71.2). 
1.8 The PJCIS tabled its report in June 2013 making 43 recommendations. 
Recommendations 1–18 related to the TIA Act and recommendations 42 and 43 
concerned data retention. These recommendations are listed at Appendix 1. It is noted 
by the committee that in February 2015 the PJCIS handed down its inquiry report on 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 
2014 which seeks to introduce a two year mandatory data retention regime in respect 
of telecommunications data (metadata) and implement recommendation 42 of the 
PJCIS's recommendations. 
The current inquiry 
1.9 The committee advertised the inquiry in The Australian newspaper on 
5 February 2014. Details of the inquiry were published on the committee's website at 
www.aph.gov.au/senate_legalcon. The committee also wrote to over 110 
organisations and individuals inviting submissions by 27 February 2014. 
1.10 The committee received 46 submissions. Public submissions were published 
on the committee’s website and are listed at Appendix 2. The committee held six 
public hearings: on 22 and 23 April 2014, 21 July 2014, 26 September 2014 and 2 
February 2015 in Canberra, and on 29 July 2014 in Sydney. The committee also took 
                                              
12  The Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Amendment Act 2012 (Cth). See: 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/privacy/implementation (accessed 25 March 2014). Among 
other things that Act amended the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to replace the existing privacy 
principles for the public and private sectors with a single set of privacy principles (the 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs)). The APPs came into effect on 12 March 2014. For 
further information about the first stage response reforms, see: 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc_docs/stage1_aus_govt_response.pdf,  and  
http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/privacy/implementation. 
13  Attorney-General's Department, Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats, 
July 2012, p. 3. 
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evidence in camera. A list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearings is at 
Appendix 3. The Hansard transcripts from the public hearings can be accessed on the 
committee’s website. 
Acknowledgement 
1.11 The committee thanks all those organisations and individuals who made 
submissions and gave evidence at the public hearings. 
Note on references  
1.12 References in the report to the committee Hansard are to the proof committee 
Hansard. Page numbers between the proof committee Hansard and the official 
Hansard may differ. 
Scope and structure of the report 
1.13 During this inquiry the committee sought to address the matters referred to it 
by examining issues raised since the reviews of the ALRC and the PJCIS. The 
committee took the approach that the recommendations of the ALRC's report relating 
to the TIA Act (including recommendation 71.2) were, to some extent, realised by the 
then Labor Government's referral of a review of potential reforms of Australia's 
national security legislation to the PJCIS committee. In that referral, the PJCIS was 
asked to examine many of the considerations set out in the ALRC's recommendation 
71.2. 
1.14 The committee notes the breadth of the recommendations of the PJCIS that 
related to the TIA Act: recommendations 1 to 18 related specifically to the existing 
provisions of the TIA Act; and recommendations 42 and 43 considered the broader 
policy issue of mandatory data retention. This committee notes that although the 
PJCIS did not reach a consensus view on mandatory data retention in its 2013 report, 
it recommended considerations that should be had if the government were persuaded 
to implement such a regime.
14
 The committee acknowledges that the 2015 PJCIS 
report into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 examines issues relating to data retention with greater specificity 
and detail than does the 2013 report. 
1.15 This report comprises three chapters. The current chapter outlines the inquiry 
process. Chapter 2 considers the need for reform to the TIA Act and chapter 3 
discusses warranted access to telecommunications content. 
1.16 The committee could not reach agreement in relation to access to data and 
mandatory data retention. The minority reports at the conclusion of this committee 
report outline committee members' views on these issues. 
                                              
14  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security Legislation, June 2013, pp. 192–193. 
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Chapter 2 
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 
2.1 This chapter of the report considers the need for reform of the 
Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) and the possible 
approaches to reform. 
Why is reform needed? 
2.2 Legislation to protect the privacy of individuals was introduced in 1960 
through the Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960, which prohibited the 
interception of telephonic communications except where authorised in the interests of 
the security of the Commonwealth.
1
 That Act was repealed and replaced by the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 on 1 June 1980.
2
 In 2006, the 
Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 was amended to change the name of the 
Act (amongst other things) to the current Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).
3
 The Attorney-General's Department (the department) 
has advised that  the objectives of the TIA Act are as follows: 
 to protect the privacy of telecommunications by criminalising the interception 
or accessing of communications; and 
 to enable law enforcement, anti-corruption and national security agencies to 
investigate serious wrongdoing by allowing those agencies to apply for 
warrants to intercept communications when investigating serious crimes and 
threats to national security.
4
 
2.3 The objectives of the TIA Act remain largely the same as those in the 1960 
legislation.
5
 Of course, the TIA Act dates well before the age of the internet, and 
                                              
1  http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C1960A00027 (accessed 3 July 2014). 
2  http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C1960A00027 (accessed 3 July 2014). 
3  At the time that the Act was amended to change its name, it was also amended to implement a 
number of the recommendations of the Report of the Review of the Regulation of Access to 
Communications (the Blunn Report) which had concluded: '[T]here was inadequate regulation 
of access to stored communications, as well as insufficient protection of privacy during the 
access, storage, and disposal processes of stored communications [and that] the distribution of 
provisions between the Telecommunications Act and the Telecommunications (Interception) 
Act (as it was then known) dealing with access to telecommunications data security was 
complicated, confusing and dysfunctional'. See: ALRC, For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice, 2008, pp. 2478–2479. 
4  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, pp 3–4. 
5  Section 5 of the Telephonic Communications (Interception) Act 1960 provided that telephone 
communications were not to be intercepted, the exception being by ASIO where the 
interception was in connection with the performance by ASIO 'of its functions or otherwise for 
the security of the Commonwealth'. 
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although written with the aim of remaining 'technology neutral', evidence taken by the 
committee indicated that it has failed to keep pace. 
Support for reform 
2.4 Although those who gave evidence during this inquiry had different views on 
how reform should progress, there was universal support for urgent reform of the 
telecommunications legislation. 
Law enforcement and national security agencies 
2.5 The committee heard that all law enforcement and national security agencies 
agreed that the current TIA Act was at risk of becoming ineffective without reform. 
For example, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) advised the committee that 
advancements in technology and security had 'diminished the authority initially issued 
by Parliament in 1979 in relation to interception'. As a result, according to the ACC 
there is: 
…a compelling need to modernise the TIA Act to ensure provisions keep 
pace with changes in technology…Because of changes in technology, the 
ACC is hindered in its investigation of serious and organised crime due to 
the restrictions on its ability to collect and share material obtained under the 
TIA Act.
6
  
2.6 The ACC explained that, in its view, the TIA Act 'must be capable of 
overcoming technological advances which are deliberately used to prevent law 
enforcement from lawfully intercepting and accessing communications'.
7
  
2.7 Similarly, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advised 
the committee that without modernisation not only will there be 'detrimental 
consequences' for Australia's national security and law enforcement capacities, but 
also for individual privacy.
8
  
2.8 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) emphasised to the committee that the 
need for comprehensive reform to 'avoid further degradation of existing capability 
whilst ensuring transparency' was 'becoming increasingly pressing'.
9
  
2.9 In addition to these Commonwealth agencies, state and territory law 
enforcement agencies also supported reform. For example, Victoria Police expressed 
the view that 'holistic reform of the TIA Act' was urgently needed 'if law enforcement 
agencies [were] to maintain an adequate investigative capability'.
10
 The Western 
Australian Police argued that the current legislative framework was 'not sufficient to 
adequately deal with technological change, and the attempt to address such 
                                              
6  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 23, pp 3–6. 
7  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 23, pp 3–6. 
8  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 27, p. 4. 
9  Australian Federal Police, Submission 25, p. 3. 
10  Victoria Police, Submission 6, p. 1. 
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advancements [through constant legislative amendments had] resulted in a 
complicated regime'.
11
  
Civil liberty and rule of law stakeholders 
2.10 Support for reform was also expressed by stakeholder organisations that seek 
to promote and protect the right to privacy and the rule of law. For example, the Law 
Council of Australia (Law Council) gave its 'general support' for a comprehensive 
review that considered: 
…how this legislation fits within the broader surveillance and interception 
legislative regime; whether the TIA Act can and should respond to 
emerging technological developments; and what safeguards and other 
provisions should be included in the TIA Act to ensure that it does not 
unduly burden individual rights, including the right to privacy.
12
  
2.11 ThoughtWorks Australia also supported review. It observed that, as the TIA 
Act had 'been amended more than 45 times since September 2001, [it] requires an 
overhaul to bring it into the digital age, to properly integrate Australia's National 
Privacy Principles, and to uphold…[Australia's] obligations under international human 
rights law.'
13
  
2.12 Blueprint for Free Speech similarly noted that it would be 'prudent to 
modernise the legislation to account for new technology and new challenges faced in 
gathering evidence for criminal investigations'.
14
  
Approach to reform 
2.13 The findings of the ALRC and PJCIS reports and evidence received 
throughout the inquiry indicate that legislative reform must seek to achieve 
administrative efficiencies, remain technology neutral and maintain adequate 
oversight and privacy protections. The then Secretary of the Attorney-General's 
department expressed this approach to reform succinctly: 
The key driver for reform is the need to create a privacy and access regime 
that is fit for the modern telecommunications environment and that can 
withstand rapid technological change into the future…[R]eform of the TIA 
Act…also represent[s] an opportunity to modernise and strengthen 
protections afforded to Australian telecommunications, limit the range of 
agencies in accessing telecommunications data while also introducing 
                                              
11  Western Australian Police, Submission 20, p. 4. Northern Territory (NT) Police also expressed 
support for reform of the TIA to 'provide greater simplicity, clarity and efficiency of operations 
under those acts'. See: NT Police, Submission 21, p. 10. 
12  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, p. 4. 
13  ThoughtWorks Australia, Submission 5, p. [2]. The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF), made 
similar comments, stating its support for a holistic review to consider the cumulative effect of 
the many marginal changes over time. See: Mr Nigel Waters, Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Committee Hansard, 29 July 2014, p. 30. 
14  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 4, p. 15. 
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stronger oversight mechanisms and improv[ing] the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the current accountability and reporting regimes.
15
  
2.14 The department suggested that although the 'basic values underpinning the 
Act are probably sound and do not require revision or amendment': 
[T]he law requires agencies and other users to navigate an incredibly 
complex modern communications environment using powers and 
procedures designed in the 1970s…The antiquated nature of the Act 
presents real and very pressing challenges for these agencies…The privacy 
protections and the oversight regimes established by the Act are in better 
shape, but even these protections are fragmented and, in places, internally 
inconsistent after 35 years of ad hoc amendment.
16
  
2.15 This approach to reform was consistent with views expressed by the 
technology industry—the Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU) submitted that: 
[A]ny legislative changes should adopt a technology neutral, principles 
based approach that would better withstand technological change and 
couple that with preservation of fundamental citizen rights. At least, any 
changes to the legislation should avoid wherever possible being unduly 
technology specific, as that obviously leads to endless amounts of 
specification that would need to be adjusted on a continuing basis.
17
  
Balancing the right to privacy and national interests 
2.16 Any programme of reform must balance individual and national interests with 
sensitivity and maturity. The need for balance was clearly expressed by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) following its 2006-8 review of the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth): 
As a recognised human right, privacy protection generally should take 
precedence over a range of other countervailing interests, such as cost and 
convenience. It is often the case, however, that privacy rights will clash 
with a range of other individual rights and collective interests, such as 
freedom of expression and national security. International instruments on 
human rights and growing international and domestic jurisprudence in this 
field all recognise that privacy protection is not an absolute. Where 
circumstances require, the vindication of individual rights must be balanced 
carefully against other competing rights.
18
 
2.17 Although the view that the need for urgent reform of the telecommunications 
legislation was universal, the objective of protecting privacy was not diminished. The 
                                              
15  Mr Roger Wilkins AO, Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 
22 April 2014, p. 2. 
16  Mr Roger Wilkins AO, Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 
22 April 2014, p. 2. 
17  Ms Narelle Clark, President, Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU), Committee Hansard, 
23 April 2014, p. 32. 
18  For Your Information – Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) Report #108, p. 104. 
 13 
 
evidence received by the committee emphasised that the right to access 
telecommunications information should only be exercised when both proportionate 
and appropriate. For example, the Law Council explained: 
…where a State seeks to restrict human rights, such as the right to privacy, 
for legitimate and defined purposes, for example in the context of 
telecommunications access and interception, the principles of necessity and 
proportionality must be applied. The measures taken must be appropriate 
and the least intrusive to achieve the objective. 
In the context of telecommunications access and interception, this involves 
balancing the intrusiveness of the interference, against operational needs. 
Interception of, or access to communications, will not be proportionate if it 
is excessive in the circumstances or if the information sought could 
reasonably be obtained by other means.
19
  
  
                                              
19  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, p. 5. 
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Chapter 3 
Warranted access to telecommunication content 
3.1 The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) 
provides a legislative framework that criminalises the interception and accessing of 
telecommunications. However, the Act prescribes exceptions that enable law 
enforcement, anti-corruption and national security agencies to apply for warrants to 
intercept communications when investigating serious crimes and threats to national 
security. The warrant regime provides these agencies with lawful access to 
telecommunications content. 
3.2 This chapter provides an overview of the existing warrant framework within 
the TIA Act and then discusses opportunities for legislative reform. The overview 
provides an insight into the complexity of the current legislation. 
3.3 In examining the warranted access regime to telecommunications content, the 
committee was informed by the 2013 report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) which recommended that the proportionality test 
within the TIA Act be revised and consideration be given to implementing a 
consistent proportionality test across interception and access to telecommunications 
content. The committee was also informed by the 2015 report of the PJCIS into 
mandatory data retention that re-considered the issue of proportionality in context of 
necessity, efficacy and the current risk environment.
1
  
An overview of the warrant regime 
3.4 Chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA Act2 provide for warranted access to 
telecommunications,   including   both   communications   passing   across 
telecommunications services (that is, the interception of live communications), and 
stored telecommunications content.
3
  
3.5 The Attorney-General's Department (the department) provided the following 
description of the four existing warrant regimes that enable law enforcement and anti-
corruption agencies to lawfully access the content of communications: 
                                              
1  PJCIS data retention report, paragraph 2.102, p. 37. 
2  The TIA Act is comprised of five chapters. 
3  The process which the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is required to 
follow for warrants, differs to those for anti-corruption agencies and law enforcement agencies 
and has not been specifically addressed in the body of the report. The sections relevant to ASIO 
are sections 9, 9A and section 109 of the TIA Act. By way of example, where ASIO has 
applied to the Attorney-General for a warrant under section 9 of the Act, the Attorney-General     
may issue a warrant where satisfied that the telecommunication service is being used, or is 
likely to be used in 'activities prejudicial to security' and interception will, or is likely to, assist 
the organisation in carry out its functions. 'Activities prejudicial to security' is defined in section 
4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. 
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The TIA Act contains four warrant regimes for lawful access to the content 
of communications by law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies. Three 
of these warrants relate to access to 'live' communications, and the fourth 
relates to access to 'stored' communications held by carriers. 
The distinction between access to live and stored communications currently 
embodied in the TIA Act is based on an assumption that stored 
communications were generally more 'considered' and so less privacy 
sensitive.
4
 
3.6 In addition, the Act provides for warrants to be issued for specific purposes, 
such as locating missing persons or locating a caller in an emergency. 
Telecommunications service warrants and named person warrants 
3.7 The provisions within Chapter 2 of the TIA Act enable 'agencies' to apply for 
telecommunications service warrants and named person warrants to an eligible judge 
or nominated member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Act 
prescribes that the judge or nominated member of the AAT may issue a warrant in the 
circumstances where they are satisfied that the information likely to be obtained under 
the warrant would be likely to assist in the investigation of a 'serious offence' and they 
have had regard to a number of factors to ensure that the issuing of a warrant is 
proportionate in the circumstances.
5
 This is referred to as a proportionality test. 
3.8 For the purposes of Chapter 2 of the TIA Act, 'agencies' is defined as 
'interception agencies' which is further defined as the Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) or the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI); or an eligible authority of a state in relation to which 
a ministerial declaration under section 34 is in force. Section 34 of the TIA Act 
enables the Minister, by legislative instrument, at the request of the Premier of a State, 
to declare an 'eligible authority' of that State to be an 'agency' for the purposes of the 
Act. The Act defines an 'eligible authority' in relation to a state to mean: 
 in any case—the police force of that state; or 
 in the case of New South Wales—the Crime Commission, the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption, the Inspector of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption, the Police Integrity Commission or the 
Inspector of the Police Integrity Commission; or 
 in the case of Victoria—the Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption 
Commission (IBAC) or the Victorian Inspectorate; or 
 in the case of Queensland—the Crime and Misconduct Commission; or 
 in the case of Western Australia—the Corruption and Crime Commission or 
the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission; or 
                                              
4  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 17. 
5  See sections 46 and 46A of the TIA Act which set out the factors to which the Judge or AAT 
member must have regard when considering an application for a telecommunications service 
interception warrant or a named person warrant. 
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 in the case of South Australia—the Independent Commissioner Against 
Corruption. 
3.9 'Serious offence' is defined in section 5D of the TIA Act. The definition is 
complex but includes, among other things, murder, kidnapping, bribery, market 
misconduct and other offences that are punishable by imprisonment for life or for a 
period, or maximum period, of at least seven years. 
Stored telecommunications warrants 
3.10 In certain circumstances, 'enforcement agencies' (defined below) can require 
that a carrier preserve all stored communications the carrier holds that relate to the 
person or telecommunications service specified in a notice.
6
  The communications 
stored may then be accessed, by warrant,  in  prescribed  circumstances.
7
 Like 
telecommunications service warrants, a proportionality test is also applied. The 
proportionality test applied in this circumstance involves 'serious contravention'. 
3.11 Where an 'enforcement agency' has applied to an 'issuing authority' (defined 
below) for a stored telecommunications warrant, the TIA Act provides that the 'issuing 
authority' may issue the warrant if satisfied that the information likely to be obtained 
under the warrant would be likely to assist in the investigation of a 'serious 
contravention' and the 'issuing authority' has had regard to a number of matters to 
ensure that the issuing of a warrant is proportionate in the circumstances.
8
 
3.12 'Enforcement agency' is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act. The definition 
includes: the AFP, a police force of a state, anti-corruption bodies, the ACLEI, the 
ACC, authorities prescribed by legislation, and, any body whose functions include: 
(i) administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or (ii) administering a law 
relating to the protection of the public revenue. 
3.13 'Issuing authority' is defined in section 5 of the Act as 'a person in respect of 
whom an appointment is in force under section 6DB'.
9
 Certain judges, magistrates and 
AAT members who are also enrolled as legal practitioners may be appointed by the 
Minister to be an 'issuing authority'.
10
  
3.14 'Serious contravention' is defined in section 5E of the TIA Act. Like the 
definition of 'serious offence' in section 5D of the Act, the definition of 'serious 
contravention' in section 5E is complex. It includes a Commonwealth, state or 
territory offence punishable by imprisonment for a period, or a maximum period, of at 
least three years. The definition also includes offences punishable by a maximum fine 
                                              
6  The legislative framework governing stored telecommunications warrants is set out in Chapter 
3 of the TIA Act. 
7  See Chapter 3 of the TIA Act. 
8  Subsection 116(2) of the TIA Act sets out the matters to which the issuing authority must have 
regard when considering an application for a stored communications warrant. 
9  This definition presents particular issues in relation to access to telecommunications data which 
are examined in Part II of this report. 
10  Sections 5, 5E and 6DB, TIA Act. 
18  
 
of at least 180 penalty units
11
 or a contravention of the law which would make an 
individual liable to pay a pecuniary penalty of the same magnitude. 
Removing legislative duplication in the warrant regime 
3.15 Throughout this inquiry the committee received evidence regarding the 
complexity of the existing legislative framework that governs warranted access to 
telecommunications content.
12
 Stakeholders consistently impressed upon the 
committee the need to remove legislative duplication from the warrant framework. 
Many proposed the introduction of a single warrant regime that authorised 
interception of content, whether live or stored, on the basis of prescribed attributes. 
This is referred to as 'attribute-based interception'. Proponents of this approach argued 
that it would reduce complexity by removing the distinction between a 'serious 
offence' and a 'serious contravention' while also providing a single clear 
proportionality test.
13
  
3.16 Submitters identified an administrative burden associated with the complex 
duplication within the existing TIA Act. The then Director-General of Security 
explained: 
[I]n order to look at a particular individual we may need to take out three or 
four different warrants, each of which requires a considered three- or four- 
page argument, and yet the argument is actually the same in all of the 
warrants. So to be able to combine a number of warranted activities 
together…is one such example. The ability to intercept according to a 
number of different selectors, rather than just the name of a person and a 
telephone number, for example, to be able to intercept on the basis of other 
attributes—call areas, time or whatever—would be a great help. It does not 
in any way change the level of intrusiveness but it simply makes the 
bureaucratic processes a lot simpler.
14
 
3.17 ASIO noted however, that there would be instances where legislative 
duplication would remain both necessary and appropriate: 
Over time, the many amendments to the TIA Act have resulted in 
duplication and complexity making the Act difficult to understand and 
apply. Conversely, there is intentional duplication for provisions that apply 
specifically to ASIO with separate provisions for enforcement agencies. For 
example, voluntary disclosure provisions for ASIO are covered under 
                                              
11  One penalty unit is currently $170. 
12  Among others, the following organisations cited support for removal of legislative duplication: 
Victoria Police, Submission 6, p. 2; Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission, 
Submission 14, p. 16; Northern Territory Police, Submission 21, p. 8; and New South Wales 
Government, Submission 30, p. 13. 
13  These same matters were canvassed by the PJCIS throughout its inquiry which reported in June 
2013 (see that committee's recommendations 6, 7 and 10) and are discussed further at 
paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28 of this chapter. 
14  Mr David Irvine, Director-General of Security, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO), Committee Hansard, 21 July 2014, p. 7. 
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section 174 whereas section 177 relate[s] to enforcement agencies. ASIO 
supports the recommendation to remove legislative duplication but notes it 
should not be applied in instances where there is a necessary distinction 
between ASIO's security intelligence role and law enforcement agencies.
15
  
3.18 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) stated that in its view, '[r]emoving 
duplicative processes and complexity within the TIA Act [would] simplify the 
processes for agencies and may assist in achieving transparency by removing 
legislative intricacy'.
16
 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association 
(AMTA) and the Communications Alliance similarly supported removing legislative 
duplication; these organisations added that legislative duplication between the TIA 
Act and the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Telecommunications Act) should also be 
considered.
17
  
3.19 Although many submitters were strongly supportive of a single warrant 
regime, the Law Council of Australia (Law Council) cautioned that it would be 
important not to introduce such a regime at the expense of privacy safeguards: 
The Law Council supports the removal of legislative duplication but not 
where this involves a single warrant regime which would make it difficult 
for issuing authorities to adequately assess the privacy impacts of the 
powers under the warrant. Given the particularly intrusive nature of 
telecommunications interception, legislative clarity must not be achieved to 
the detriment of privacy principles.
18
  
A single attribute-based interception regime 
3.20 The department explained that under the existing provisions of the TIA Act, 
warrants issued may only authorise the interception of 'services' or 'devices'—such as 
a particular internet connection or telephone: 
The service or device identifiers are the technical means that the 
telecommunications industry uses to identify the communications for 
retrieval under a warrant. This approach is technologically-specific and 
reflects historic assumptions about how telecommunications operate. The 
diversification of the telecommunications industry, changing 
communications habits and changes to the technical operation of modern 
telecommunications networks mean that new ways of identifying 
communications are both available and required.
19
 
3.21 The department stated that in its view '[w]ithout reform, technological change 
will make the current, service and device-based provisions obsolete'.
20
 The department 
                                              
15  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 34. 
16  Australian Federal Police, Submission 25, Attachment E, p. 5. 
17  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance, Submission 
16, pp 7–8. 
18  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, pp 39–40. 
19  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 17. 
20  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 17. 
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recommended the single attribute-based warrant regime as a more targeted and 
technologically-neutral approach: 
[T]he reality is that this Act was very cleverly drafted in 1979 in that it was 
technologically neutral and it has been able to capture all communications 
as they have come along, without any need to consider the implications of 
that technology. The reality now is that people communicate with very 
smart phones…and they do allow you to communicate in many, many ways 
with one device. The Act really is just saying that law enforcement can 
intercept that device without any approach that allows you to target the kind 
of information that you want. 
What the Act does not do at the moment is have any real way to define 
what kind of information should be collected by law enforcement for them 
to investigate crimes. What the Act currently says is you can collect 
evidence; however, you must do it in a very broad, crude way.
21
  
3.22 The department explained that it was advocating for a change in the 
legislation to a single attribute-based warrant regime as such a regime would: 
 better protect the privacy of communications 'because law enforcement and 
national security agencies [would] have to determine the kind of 
communications they want to collect'; and 
 allow telecommunications providers 'to target a stream of traffic rather than 
volumes of traffic'.
22
  
3.23 ASIO echoed these views. According to ASIO, the TIA Act, as currently 
written, 'limits the technical means by which agencies can conduct interception by 
requiring interception be based on either a "service" identifier (for example, a 
telephone number or email address) or a piece of "equipment" (for example, a mobile 
telephone handset)'.
23
 ASIO advocated the 'decoupling' of the techniques for 
interception from the authorisation to intercept and expressed its support for attribute-
based interception: 
"Attributes" are specific identifying characteristics that can be used in 
combination to identify unique communications of interest to ASIO. 
Attribute-based interception encompasses service-based or equipment-
based interception. It also allows ASIO to target specific attributes to 
collect communications of interest more effectively and less intrusively.
24
 
3.24 ASIO provided some examples of attributes that could be used: 
- …some individual attributes that could be combined to enable better 
interception targeting could include: 
                                              
21  Ms Katherine Smith, Assistant Secretary, Telecommunications and Surveillance Law Branch, 
Attorney-General's Department, Proof Committee Hansard, 22 April 2014, p. 3. 
22  Ms Katherine Smith, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 22 April 2014, p. 3. 
23  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 33. 
24  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 33. 
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- the source and/or destination of the communication; 
- the type of communication (for example, a video call, email, SMS); 
- the equipment being used to convey the communication (for example 
mobile telephone handset, cell tower); 
- any identifier being used in connection with the communication (such 
as a number or username); 
- a time period in which a communication is made or received; or 
- the location of the person making or receiving the communication. 
3.25 The selection of a combination of attributes in each particular case would 
involve a number of considerations, including the extent to which: 
- the telecommunications provider had the ability to intercept the 
chosen attributes; 
- attributes (singly or in combination) were sufficiently precise to give 
a high degree of certainty communications of interest are accessed; 
and 
- certain components of a communication could be excluded on the 
basis they were likely to be irrelevant.
25
  
3.26 In ASIO's view the approach of 'attribute-based interception': 
…would allow agencies to filter and limit the communications they 
intercept more efficiently, helping to minimise the collection of extraneous 
information. With this more specific method of targeting the 
telecommunications of interest, the more certain we can be that we are 
excluding from incidental interception the communications of persons who 
are not of interest and whose privacy should be protected.
26
 
3.27 In its 2013 report, the PJCIS observed that advancements in 
telecommunications technology were diminishing the effectiveness of the current 
interception framework. As a result, the PJCIS recommended that the interception of 
communications should be conducted on the basis of specific attributes of 
communications as a means of 'arresting the decline of interception capability, while 
also offering additional privacy protections by better targeting communications which 
are of particular relevance to the serious crime or national security threat which is 
being investigated'.
27
 
3.28 Submitters to this inquiry cited the PJCIS's recommendation of a single 
warrant regime and suggested that the introduction of such a regime would be a means 
by which telecommunications interception legislation could be simplified and also 
                                              
25  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 33. 
26  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 33. 
27  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security 
Legislation, June 2013, p. 34. 
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respond to advancements in technology. The ACC and AFP also expressed support for 
a single attribute-based interception regime.
28
 
How would it work? 
3.29 The department explained how it anticipated 'attribute-based' interception 
would apply in practice. A warrant would still need to be issued to authorise access to 
a particular person's communications but, according to the department, that 'attribute-
based' warrant: 
…would describe the communications that the service provider is to access 
and provide to the agency by using a combination of technical features or 
'attributes'—rather than just a service or device identifier. Those attributes 
could include a specific account, a time of day, a geographic location or a 
technical feature of the communication.
29
  
3.30 The department explained that, in its view, attribute-based interception would 
enable warrants to be more targeted and would also minimise the lawful collection of 
irrelevant communications. 
Concerns raised in relation to attribute-based interception 
3.31 Although there was wide-spread support for the introduction of an attribute-
based interception warrant regime throughout the law enforcement community, some 
concern was expressed by other stakeholders. 
3.32 The Law Council advised that its reservations in relation to attribute-based 
interception are based on the view that 'attribute-based' has not been sufficiently 
defined to allow the 'true privacy implications' associated with such a model to be 
assessed.
30
 
3.33 In raising its objections, the Law Council noted the challenges that 'existing 
and emerging telecommunications technologies pose for agencies attempting to 
accurately identify the communications they intend to intercept or access',
31
 and went 
on to express general support for: 
…efforts to develop a warrant regime that focuses on better targeting the 
characteristics of a communication and enables it to be isolated from 
communications that are not of interest. However, the Law Council is keen 
to ensure this does not occur at the expense of specific provisions designed 
to ensure that each particular device or service to be intercepted or 
communication to be accessed is clearly identified and shown to be 
justifiable and necessary, and that it occurs in a manner that has the least 
intrusive impact on individual rights and privacy.
32
 
                                              
28  See: ACC, Submission 23, Attachment A, p. [3] and AFP, Submission 25, Attachment E, p. 4. 
29  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 18. 
30  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, pp 33–34. 
31  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, pp 33–34. 
32  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, pp 33–34. This view was shared by AMTA and the 
Communications Alliance. See: Submission 16, p. 6. 
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3.34 The department explained to the committee that a single attribute-based 
warrant would enable more targeted interception and, therefore, provide a higher level 
of privacy protection. To demonstrate this, the department noted how the current 
framework provides for a law enforcement agency to intercept a device without any 
approach to targeting the kind of information wanted: 
[For example] [a]t the moment, a service warrant would allow you to 
collect against a particular service. If it is Joe Bloggs's smart phone, that 
actually is the service, and everything that sits on that smart phone—every 
bit of content, whether it be Candy Crush, Skype or their email—that 
service is all of that, and the warrant does not have the specificity at the 
moment to say, "Actually, we don't want their livestreaming of the cricket; 
we just want the particular communication". 
… 
The problem at the moment is that the warrant is quite broad in its 
approach, and what we want to do is have much better specificity. It may be 
that they will collect the voice, the email and the livestream of the cricket, 
but we want to be able to identify those as attributes of the whole 
communication channel rather than just saying, "Give it all to us, and we'll 
decipher it later".
33
 
3.35 In expressing support for the introduction of a single attribute-based warrant 
regime both ASIO and the ACC acknowledged the need to ensure the maintenance of 
'the proportionality thresholds and accountability requirements…to deliver public 
confidence and assurance regarding the use of these powers'
34
 in any new regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Scott Ludlam 
Inquiry Chair 
  
                                              
33  Ms Katherine Smith, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 22 April 2014, p. 3. 
34  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 35. See also: ACC, Submission 23, Attachment A, p. [6]. 
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Chair's Minority Additional Comments 
Access to telecommunications data 
1.1 In addition to a regime that allows for warranted access to 
telecommunications content (as discussed in Chapter 3), the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) also provides for agencies to access 
telecommunications data (metadata). A key difference between the regimes is that 
access to this data does not require a warrant; instead an 'authorised officer' (defined 
below) within an 'enforcement agency' can authorise access.
1
 In considering whether 
or not to grant an authorisation, an 'authorised officer' is required by law to give 
consideration to privacy.  
1.2 These additional comments discuss the ability of 'enforcement agencies' to 
access telecommunications data via authorisation and considers whether there is a 
need for change. The terms 'telecommunications data' and 'metadata' are used 
interchangeably. 
An overview of the telecommunications data access regime 
1.3 Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Telecommunications Act) 
imposes obligations on 'eligible persons' to protect the confidentiality of information 
relating to the contents of communications and the affairs and personal particulars of 
other persons.
2
  
1.4 The term 'eligible person' is defined in section 271 of the Telecommunications 
Act. 'Eligible person' for the purposes of Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act is: a 
carrier; or a carriage service provider; or an employee of a carrier; or an employee of a 
carriage service provider; or a telecommunications contractor; or an employee of a 
telecommunications contractor. 
1.5 If these provisions are breached, the 'eligible person' is guilty of an offence. 
However, the TIA Act sets out circumstances where the relevant sections in Part 13 of 
the Telecommunications Act
3
 will not prohibit the disclosure of information or a 
document.
4
 These circumstances are set out in Division 3 (in relation to ASIO), 
Division 4 (in relation to 'enforcement agencies') and Division 4A (in relation to 
foreign law enforcement) of Chapter 4 of the TIA Act. 
                                              
1  'Enforcement agency' is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act. Notably it includes any body 
whose functions include: (i) administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or (ii) 
administering a law relating to the protection of public revenue. See also: paragraph 3.10 of 
Chapter 3 which sets out the definition. 
2  See sections 276, 277 and 278, Telecommunications Act. 
3  Sections 276, 277 and 278, Telecommunications Act. 
4  However, the TIA Act does not permit the disclosure of this information if it is the contents or 
substance of a communication, or a document to the extent that the document contains the 
contents or substance of a communication. See: section 172, TIA Act. 
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1.6 The Division 4 provisions specify that 'enforcement agencies' can access 
telecommunications data by prescribing that an 'authorised officer' of an 'enforcement 
agency' may authorise disclosure of specified information if the disclosure of the 
information would be 'reasonably necessary' for: 
 enforcement of a criminal law;
5
 or 
 enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or for the protection of 
public revenue.
6
  
1.7 Before making an authorisation under Division 4, the authorised officer is 
required, by section 180F of the TIA Act, to have regard to: 
[W]hether any interference with the privacy of any person or persons that 
may result from the disclosure or use is justifiable, having regard to the 
following matters: (a) the likely relevance and usefulness of the information 
or documents; (b) the reason why the disclosure or use concerned is 
proposed to be authorised.
7
  
1.8 As set out in Chapter 3, submitters raised concerns in relation to the 
standardisation of the proportionality tests used across the TIA Act given that the 
proportionality test applied in authorising access to telecommunications data is 
significantly lower than the proportionality test involved in seeking to intercept live 
communications or access stored content. In the case of content, the proportionality 
test relates back to serious offence and serious contravention respectively. In the case 
of authorising access to telecommunications data, a much lower threshold can be 
established by linking necessity of accessing the information with 'enforcement of a 
law imposing a pecuniary penalty or for the protection of public revenue'.  
What is telecommunications data? 
1.9 The term 'telecommunications data', also referred to as metadata, 
communications data and communications associated data, is not defined in the 
TIA Act. However, the term is generally accepted as being 'information about the 
process of a communication, as distinct from its content'.
8
  
1.10 The department explained that although 'telecommunications data' is not 
defined in the Act, the term has 'come to encompass a broad range of different types 
of information' and that the department uses a working definition.
9
 The working 
                                              
5  Section 178, TIA Act. 
6  Section 179, TIA Act. Division 4 of the TIA Act also provides for authorised officer of the 
Australian Federal Police or a state police force to authorise disclosure for the purposes of 
locating missing persons  and for an authorised officer of a criminal law enforcement agency to 
authorise access to prospective information if satisfied that disclosure of the information is 
reasonably necessary for the investigation of: a serious offence; or an offence against the 
Commonwealth, a state or territory law punishable by imprisonment for at least three years. 
7  Section 180F, TIA Act. 
8  Attorney-General's Department, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Annual Report 2012-13, p. 44. 
9  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 21. 
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definition is: information or documents that are not the content of a communication, 
and includes the following types of information, which fall into the following two 
categories and relate to communications for telephones (both fixed and mobile) and 
the internet:  
 Information that allows a communication to occur: 
 the internet identifier (information that uniquely identifies a person on 
the internet) assigned to the user by the provider; 
 for mobile service: the number called or texted; 
 the service identifier used to send a communication, for example the 
customer’s email address, phone number or VoIP number; 
 the time and date of a communication; 
 general location information, that is, cell tower; and 
 the duration of the communication. 
 Information about the parties to the communications is information about the 
person who owns the service. This would include: 
 name of the customer; 
 address of the customer; 
 postal address of the customer (if different); 
 billing address of the customer (if different); 
 contact details, mobile number, email address and landline phone 
number; and 
 same information on recipient party if known by the service provider.
10
 
1.11 Section 172 of the TIA Act makes it clear that access to telecommunications 
data is not intended to allow access to the content or substance of a communication. 
The committee heard, however, that what is now captured as telecommunications data 
is a far broader subset of information than was captured in 1979. Appendix 4 sets out 
an example, provided by iiNet Limited, of the telecommunications data that is 
generated by a website, a Facebook page and a tweet. 
1.12 Electronic Frontiers Australia argued that this technological change has 
altered the nature of metadata to the extent that telecommunications metadata, in 
many circumstances, is more sensitive than the content of a communication: 
In terms of looking at the current context of where we are compared to 
when this Act was written in 1979, obviously there have been a few 
changes in the way people communicate…In line with that, we reject pretty 
strongly the assertion that taking the powers of this Act from 1979, a 
                                              
10  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 46. The department expressly stated that the 
definition of telecommunications data 'does not include information relating to a person's web 
browsing or the contents or substance of their communications'. See: Submission 26, p. 46.  
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context where mobile phones did not exist and the internet was still a 
pipedream, and extending those powers into a context of ubiquitous mobile 
devices and internet usage is not in any way a logical extension of the law 
to, as it were, keep up with technology on a like-for-like basis. We strongly 
believe that in fact this represents a very dramatic escalation of surveillance 
deep into all aspects of people's lives and goes far beyond anything 
originally envisaged when this act was drafted.
11
 
1.13 Electronic Frontiers Australia provided the following example of the extent to 
which the volume of metadata had changed since 1979: 
[W]hen this Act was originally drafted, the information that you would get 
would be the fact that a phone call was made from No. A to No. B at a 
certain time and lasted a certain duration. That is four pieces of information. 
As soon as you widen that into a mobile phone context, all of a sudden you 
have got a location at each point, which is an entirely new thing, where 
literally people's locations can be tracked. Then, if you go beyond that into 
non-telephonic communications, all of a sudden the amount of information 
that has been collected starts to explode. You start to have potentially 
dozens, if not hundreds, of different points of data that can tell all sorts of 
things about what is going on. It is really quite a different scale, a different 
scope, a different context, and it needs to have very different rules.
12
 
1.14 The Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU) was of a similar view and stated 
that it could not agree with the argument that metadata is not content: 
Over recent times much discussion has also taken place on metadata, with 
assertions that metadata does not include the content of communication. We 
contend that, without appropriate technological standards defined by an 
independent standards body, this claim is inherently untrue. Information 
gathered by existing mechanisms about the material that transits across an 
internet network—for example, by using the web page addresses visited by 
a user—inherently contains specific addresses for many, many elements 
within the page, even third-party elements in turn requested by the page, 
such as advertising. 
Thus, the amount revealed about an individual, their family, workmates and 
broader community is potentially very large. In many cases also this data is 
dynamic and changes from moment to moment, and often today even 
depends on the types of other sites visited by users, with the advent of 
cookie correlation—none of which is under any control by the individual 
users. This is further complicated by the emergence of apps, where users 
                                              
11  Mr Jon Lawrence, Executive Officer, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 
29 July 2014, p. 35. 
12  Mr Jon Lawrence, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2014, p. 38. 
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have extremely little knowledge of the level of security or the pervasiveness 
and the types of actions going on in the background.
13
 
1.15 The department acknowledged that changes in technology did have 
implications for identifying the distinction between telecommunications data and 
content:  
At times, the distinction between 'telecommunications data' and 'content of 
a communication' may become less clear. This is particularly the case for 
information that, while not obviously the 'substance' of a communication, 
could contain or reveal substantive information, such as: 
- email subject lines—subject lines can be used to convey the substance 
of a communication, and 
- Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)—the details of which web page a 
person visited can reveal the content that a person accessed.
14
 
1.16 The department informed the committee that in situations where it is unclear, 
its advice to agencies, industry participants and the public, has been that: 
[A]ny information that contains or reveals the content of a communication 
is protected by the prohibitions on interception and access to content under 
sections 7 and 108 of the TIA Act.
15
 
Using telecommunications data 
1.17 As set out in Division 4 of Chapter 4 of the TIA Act, access to 
telecommunications data by authorisation is intended to be used when disclosure is 
considered reasonably necessary for the enforcement of a criminal law or a law 
imposing a pecuniary penalty, or for the protection of the public revenue. 
1.18 Throughout its inquiry, the committee heard that the use of 
telecommunications data by law enforcement agencies is often vital in subsequently 
establishing the grounds for obtaining access to the content of a communication, via 
warrant, pursuant to Chapter 2 or 3 of the TIA Act. For example, the Australian 
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), explained the usefulness of 
metadata in the early stages of an investigation: 
I would like to emphasise the importance of access to data at the 
preliminary stages of an investigation. Investigations such as Operation 
Heritage seek to uncover the full extent of a corrupt network, but often start 
with only snippets of information or credible allegations. Data about who a 
person of interest is talking to is often a critical first step that provides a 
foundation for further investigation including, at a much later stage, seeking 
                                              
13  Ms Narelle Clark, President, ISOC-AU, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, p. 32. 
ThoughtWorks expressed similar views explaining that technology has changed 
communications such that 'really there is no distinction between metadata and content'. See, 
Ms Lindy Stephens, ThoughtWorks, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 4. 
14  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 45. 
15  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 26, p. 45. Sections 9 and 108 of the TIA Act 
prohibit access to communications and therefore access would require a warrant. 
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a warrant for interception. It also allows us to rule out at an early stage 
people who are unlikely to be complicit, thereby preventing the need for 
unnecessary investigation and deeper intrusion of privacy.
16
 
1.19 Queensland Police expressed a similar view regarding the utility of 
telecommunications data: 
The warrantless data we capture regularly is used to in order to assist you 
reaching the threshold to obtain the warrant, so in nearly all cases you 
would be using the warrantless information to assist you to gather the 
information which aided you to reach the threshold you needed to obtain 
the warrant for telephone interception. That is one of its most common uses. 
Obtaining data from your phone that is able to tell us about connections 
between people at different times, aids in painting the picture which, added 
with other intelligence and evidence, raises you to the threshold of being 
able to obtain a warrant. That is one of those distinctions I think we need to 
make between the warrantless and warrant based processes.
17
 
1.20 The Board of the ACC similarly described to the committee how, in its view, 
accessing telecommunications data without a warrant enables law enforcement 
agencies to only seek access to content (via a warrant) where necessary: 
[W]hat [telecommunications data] often does is confirm someone's 
involvement in crime. After that confirmation we often go to the next level, 
which is obtaining a warrant et cetera for content. So at a fundamental level 
what it often does for us is confirm that a person is involved with a group of 
people who are committing, for example, organised crime. Then we build 
on that as far as obtaining a warrant for content down the track. 
Fundamentally what it is used for is that confirmation of involvement. 
I think it was mentioned by one of my colleagues that it should not be 
underestimated how many citizens are excluded from ongoing intrusive law 
enforcement interests because of that fundamental check. It [is] still 
sensitive information—there is no question about that—but we do exclude a 
considerable number of people in that first-step process.
18
 
1.21 The Board of the ACC emphasised that it understood the need to protect 
metadata and expressed its view that this data, although not content, is by no means 
'innocuous': 
We do not believe that this is innocuous. We accept that you can build a 
picture. What we are saying is that it is a building block in many ways for 
further, more intrusive powers which are, quite appropriately, warranted. It 
                                              
16  Mr Philip Moss, Integrity Commissioner, Australian Commission for Law Enforcement 
Integrity, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, p. 6. 
17  Assistant Commissioner Peter Crawford, Queensland Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
22 April 2014, p. 15. 
18  Mr Paul Jevtovic APM, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Australian Crime Commission, 
Committee Hansard, 22 April 2014, p. 16. 
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is not open for us to access that information without thresholds having been 
crossed. They are not inconsiderable thresholds that we have to cross.
19
 
1.22 A similar view was expressed by Mr Alastair MacGibbon, Director of the 
Centre for Internet Safety at the University of Canberra. Mr MacGibbon, a former 
federal agent with the AFP: 
…impress[ed] upon the committee the extreme and extraordinary 
importance of metadata to assist law enforcement investigations. However, 
anyone who accesses metadata from a law enforcement point of view 
understands the gravity and the granularity of the information that is 
provided.
20
 
1.23 The department explained to the committee that telecommunications data has 
a 'set of irreplaceable characteristics that often make it the most appropriate tool for 
agencies'. The department identified these characteristics as being: 
- it is low risk—unlike the use of undercover officers, informants or 
physical surveillance, agencies can obtain valuable information without 
placing their officers, agents or operations at risk 
- it is less resource intensive—many other investigative techniques would 
require agencies to deploy teams of specialist officers to obtain basic 
information about a target and their associates; lawful access to 
telecommunications data allows agencies to prioritise the use of these 
scarce resources for the most critical investigations, and 
- it is less privacy intrusive—telecommunications data allows agencies to 
obtain factual information about communications, such as with whom, 
when and where a person was communicating, which is useful at the 
early stages of an investigation. However, as telecommunications data 
does not include the content of a communication it does not disclose 
more sensitive information about a person’s motivations or intentions, 
such as what a person was talking about or why they were 
communicating.
21
 
Growth in access to telecommunications data 
1.24 Throughout the inquiry, the committee received evidence from submitters 
critical of the growing number of authorisations being issued to 'enforcement agencies' 
                                              
19  Acting Commissioner Andrew Colvin, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 
22 April 2014, p. 15.  
20  Mr Alastair MacGibbon, Director of the Centre for Internet Safety at the University of 
Canberra, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 26. 
21  Attorney General's Department, Submission 26, p. 22. The department also explained that in the 
case of cybercrime investigations—such as, online fraud, identity theft and child exploitation 
investigations—law enforcement agencies rely heavily on telecommunications data. 
Cybercrime includes: crimes where computers or other communications technologies are 
integral to the offence, such as online fraud, identity theft and the distribution of child 
exploitation material, and crimes targeting computers, such as hacking or unauthorised access 
to data. See: Submission 26, p. 22. 
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for access to telecommunications data. Illustrating the extent of the use of 
authorisations, for the 2012-13 financial year the department reported that: 
 law enforcement agencies
22
 authorised access to telecommunications data in 
312,929 cases; 
 Commonwealth enforcement agencies
23
 made 6,254 authorisations for access 
to telecommunications data; and  
 state and territory enforcement agencies
24
 authorised access to 
telecommunications data on 691 occasions.
25
 
1.25 Given the growth in access to metadata the view that all telecommunications 
data should be accessed by warrant, making access subject to independent judicial 
oversight (for example, a judge or nominated Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) 
member), was considered throughout the inquiry.
26
  
1.26 In response to this suggestion the department stated it considered: 
…that a more holistic approach, including limiting the range of agencies 
permitted to access traffic data and requiring such access to be subject to 
independent oversight…would enable Parliament to strengthen the existing 
regime without degrading agencies' capabilities or imposing a 
disproportionate burden on agencies and issuing authorities.
27
 
                                              
22  Law enforcement agencies that accessed telecommunications data by authorisation in 2012-13 
included (but is not limited to): the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Tasmanian Police, NSW 
Police, South Australia Police, Northern Territory Police, Victoria Police, Western Australia 
Police, the Australian Crime Commission, and the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity. See: p. 47 
http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Documents/TSLB-
GAPSTIAActAnnualReport2012-13.pdf (accessed 9 August 2014). 
23  Some of the Commonwealth enforcement agencies that accessed telecommunications data by 
authorisation in 2012-13 included: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Australian Taxation Office, Customs, 
Department of Health, and the Insolvency and Trustee Service of Australia (now known as the 
Australian Financial Security Authority). See: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Documents/TSLB-
GAPSTIAActAnnualReport2012-13.pdf (accessed 9 August 2014). 
24  Among the state and territory enforcement agencies that accessed telecommunications data by 
authorisation in 2012-13 were the Victorian Department of Environment and Primary 
Industries, Worksafe Victoria, RSPCA (Victoria), RSPCA (Queensland), Bankstown City 
Council, Corrective Services NSW and the Western Australia Department of Commerce. See: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Documents/TSLB-
GAPSTIAActAnnualReport2012-13.pdf (accessed 9 August 2014). 
25  http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Documents/TSLB-
GAPSTIAActAnnualReport2012-13.pdf (accessed 9 August 2014). See: pp. 47–48. 
26  See: Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 36, pp. 5, 9; ThoughtWorks Australia, 
Submission 5, p. [2]; The Pirate Party, Submission 10, pp. 5–7.  
27  Attorney General's Department, Submission 26, p. 22. 
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1.27 The department's suggestion that the threshold for access to 
telecommunications data be reviewed and some form of independent oversight be 
introduced into the regime was similar in some respects to recommendation 5 of the 
PJCIS's June 2013 report.  
The need to review the threshold for access to telecommunications data 
1.28 In its June 2013 report, the PJCIS recommended that the threshold for access 
to telecommunications data be reviewed with a 'focus on reducing the number of 
agencies able to access telecommunications data by using gravity of conduct which 
may be investigated' as the threshold on which access is allowed.
28
  
1.29 The Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia supported this 
recommendation:  
The Commission fully supports Recommendation 5 and further supports a 
stronger threshold for access to traffic data as opposed to a lower threshold 
for access to subscriber data. The Commission considers this will 
strengthen the privacy protections within the TIA Act.
29
 
1.30 Electronic Frontiers Australia suggested that thresholds for access to 
telecommunications data 'should be set taking into account the principle of 
proportionality' and: 
…ensure that access is only available in relation to a reasonably serious 
offence—for example, a criminal offence attracting a certain maximum 
term of imprisonment or a civil offence attracting a predetermined 
minimum penalty—and where there is a reasonable suspicion of the people 
involved in such an offence.
30
  
1.31 ThoughtWorks Australia similarly argued that 'the number of agencies that 
can access this data needs to be confined to only those truly undertaking law 
enforcement and national security activities'.
31
 
1.32 In its submission to the inquiry, the department expressed concern with the 
recommendation of the PJCIS to use 'gravity of conduct' as a threshold for access on 
the basis that to do so would be inconsistent with Australia's international legal 
obligations under the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime.
32
 The 
department explained that instead of this approach it would prefer the 'imposition of 
                                              
28  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security Legislation, June 2013, p. 26.  
29  Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia, Submission 14, p. 11.  
30  Mr Jon Lawrence, Executive Officer, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 
29 July 2014, p. 36. 
31  ThoughtWorks Australia, Submission 5, p. [2]. 
32  Attorney General's Department, Submission 26, p. 21. The AFP raised similar concerns in 
relation to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. See: Submission 25, 
Attachment E, p. 3. 
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safeguards, including restricting the range of agencies permitted to access such data'
33
 
and that options be explored to:  
- create certainty about which agencies are permitted to access  
account-holder data or traffic data  
- ensure that agencies accessing any type of telecommunications data 
have a demonstrated need to do so, and  
- ensure that all agencies with data-access powers are subject to 
appropriate oversight…34 
1.33 The Australian Privacy Commissioner, Mr Timothy Pilgrim, however, in his 
evidence in respect of the mandatory data retention Bill currently before Parliament 
noted that if proportionality considerations are not considered in reviewing the 
threshold for access to telecommunications data, additional safeguards may be 
required in the legislation: 
In my submission, I did not advocate for the imposition of warrants. I took 
this position on the proviso that the bill be amended to limit the purposes 
for which telecommunications data can be used and disclosed to the 
investigation of serious crime and threats to national security. However, 
since lodging that submission, I note that the Attorney-General's 
Department has suggested that to meet Australia's obligations under the 
Council of Europe's cybercrime convention access to telecommunications 
data cannot be limited in this way. If that is the case then I consider that 
further thought needs to be given to what additional safeguards might be 
put in place when access is for the purpose of investigation of minor 
offences.35 
1.34 Similar concerns were raised by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (PJCHR) during its examination of the Bill and led that committee to 
recommend that the Bill be amended: 
…so as to avoid the disproportionate limitation on the right to privacy that 
would result from disclosing telecommunications data for the investigation 
of any offence…to limit disclosure authorisation for existing data to where 
it is 'necessary' for the investigation of specific serious crimes, or categories 
of serious crimes.
36
 
1.35 The committee heard from other stakeholders that were supportive of 
reviewing the threshold for access to telecommunications data as suggested by the 
PJCIS. For example, Blueprint for Free Speech expressed its support for a review 
stating: 
                                              
33  Attorney General's Department, Submission 26, p. 21. 
34  Attorney General's Department, Submission 26, p. 21. 
35  Mr Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner, House of Representatives Committee 
Hansard, 29 January 2015, p. 47. 
36  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report of the 44
th
 Parliament, 
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…there must be proper public consultation about the detail around which 
agencies should have continued access to telecommunications data, 
and…[the] proper description of the basis for this access and the threshold 
for same. This information should not be concealed from the broader 
Australian community, and Australians must have a say in this decision 
process.
37
 
1.36 In addition to calls for a review of the proportionality test involved in 
authorising access to telecommunications data, submitters also voiced support for 
refining the definition of 'enforcement agency' to reduce the number of agencies that 
could access the data without a warrant. For example, the Office of the Public Interest 
Monitor of Victoria supported calls for a reduction in the number of agencies 
accessing telecommunications data without a warrant, stating:  
There has been recent media attention and significant criticism of the ability 
of agencies to obtain telecommunications data and the consequential 
implications on the privacy of those who utilise telecommunications 
services. Local councils can access telecommunications data under the 
TIA Act on the basis that disclosure of the said data is reasonably necessary 
for the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty. The matters in 
respect of which telecommunications data is obtained by some agencies 
does not appear commensurate with the invasion of privacy occasioned by 
the disclosure of such data. A reduction in the number of agencies able to 
access telecommunications data by using the gravity of the conduct which 
may be investigated utilising telecommunications data as a threshold on 
which access is allowed is supported.
38
 
1.37 The Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) and the 
Communications Alliance advised the committee that there was a need for 'clarity 
around which agencies are eligible to have access to telecommunications data' and 
that this could result in cost efficiencies for industry.
39
 
1.38 The Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU) was of a similar view: 
The existing provisions do not make clear which agencies have the right to 
gain access to metadata. Should metadata be defined then there must be a 
clear understanding of which agencies are eligible to access 
communications information, and the proportionality of [the] suspected 
crime must also be correspondingly high.
40
 
1.39 Electronic Frontiers Australia also suggested that the highly invasive nature of 
this information warranted tighter restrictions to access: 
…and, ideally, a clearly defined list of agencies that are able to request 
access to data. As mentioned, there may be cases where agencies outside 
that list can apply via an approved agency, as it were, to do that, but we 
                                              
37  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 4, pp. 3–4. 
38  Office of the Public Interest Monitor Victoria, Submission 17, p. 5. 
39  AMTA and the Communications Association, Submission 16, p. 6. 
40  Ms Narelle Clark, ISOC-AU, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, p. 33. 
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think that there do need to be some very tight restrictions around that. We 
also agree that there should be very tight, very stringent and very clearly 
defined thresholds for access to data.
41
  
1.40 It is noted that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 which is currently before Parliament, seeks to 
limit the number of agencies that can access telecommunications data by redefining 
'enforcement agency'. The Bill, however, does not address the need to review the 
proportionality test in respect of accessing telecommunications data. 
Introduction of oversight for telecommunications data  
1.41 In addition to calls for a review of the threshold for access to 
telecommunications data, the committee repeatedly heard concerns raised by 
stakeholders about the lack of oversight and transparency in the telecommunications 
data access regime. 
1.42 Under the existing legislative framework, telecommunications data can be 
accessed by any agency that meets the definition of 'enforcement agency', (which 
includes 'a body whose functions include: (i) administering a law imposing a 
pecuniary penalty; or (ii) administering a law relating to the protection of public 
revenue'),
42
 where the disclosure is considered reasonably necessary for the 
enforcement of the law or the protection of public revenue and the authorised officer 
has had regard to the privacy implications of the disclosure.  
1.43 Unlike the warrant regimes of Chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA Act, Chapter 4 of 
the TIA Act does not contain any legislative framework for direct oversight of the 
authorisation process. Similarly, the legislation does not require that information 
accessed must be destroyed when it is no longer necessary, unlike the Act's 
requirements for content
43
 and as is required by Australian Privacy 
Principle (APP) 11.
44
  
                                              
41  Mr Jon Lawrence, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2014, p. 36. 
This suggestion was also made by Mr Alastair MacGibbon (see, Committee Hansard, 
26 September 2014, p. 26) and Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and 
Public Policy, Vodafone Hutchison Australia (see, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, 
p. 18). 
42  Section 5, TIA Act. 
43  Section 79 of the TIA Act and section 150 of the TIA Act prescribe that 'restricted records' (any 
information obtained by interception) and records or information obtained by accessing a stored 
communication are required to be destroyed if it is no longer likely to be required.  
44  Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 11—security of personal information:  
11.1 If an APP entity holds personal information, the entity must take such steps as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to protect the information: (a) from misuse, interference and 
loss; and (b) from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. 
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1.44 There are reporting requirements for access to data. The TIA Act requires the 
'enforcement agency' to keep a record of authorisations and report those to the 
Minister at the end of each year. Although the number of authorisations is published 
in an annual report tabled by the Minister, no further detail is provided. As the 
authorisation process occurs internally within each enforcement agency, there is no 
external oversight of or transparency about how agencies are complying with the 
obligations to balance access with privacy. 
1.45 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, who has a role in overseeing warranted 
access to telecommunications content, commented on the lack of oversight of access 
to telecommunications data. The Ombudsman explained that his office did not have 
any inspection role in relation to metadata and agreed that the oversight and reporting 
regime for telecommunications data could be improved. He suggested that there may 
also be an educational role that his office could play.
45
 The then Secretary of the  
Attorney-General's Department also explained that in his view there was a need for 
greater transparency in relation to the authorisation process for accessing 
telecommunications data.
46
   
1.46 The figures outlined at paragraph 4.24 indicate that, if the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman were to have a role in relation to inspecting access to metadata, his office 
would face an enormous workload. However, the Ombudsman suggested that the 
resourcing challenges presented by the number of authorisations for access to 
metadata that would need inspection could be met by an 'appropriate sampling 
program': 
That would be the normal approach to a volume responsibility along those 
lines. And then, if we form some views, they would need to be couched in 
language which said we had done that which we could, in the circumstances 
with which we are confronted.
47
 
1.47 An officer from the Commonwealth Ombudsman added that in addition to a 
sampling program: 
…we would have to look at the risks associated with that inspection regime. 
It may well be that the most appropriate means would be looking at 
processes rather than focusing on records per se, so looking at high-level 
                                                                                                                                            
11.2 If: (a) an APP entity holds personal information about an individual; and (b) the entity no 
longer needs the information for any purpose for which the information may be used or 
disclosed by the entity under this Schedule; and (c) the information is not contained in a 
Commonwealth record; and (d) the entity is not required by or under an Australian law, or a 
court/tribunal order, to retain the information; the entity must take such steps as are reasonable 
in the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that the information is  
de-identified. Source: Part 4 of Schedule 1 to the Privacy Act 1988. 
45  Mr Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman; Mr Simon Pomery, Assistant Director, 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, pp. 29–30.  
46  Mr Roger Wilkins AO, Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, Committee Hansard, 
23 April 2014, p. 4. 
47  Mr Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, p. 29.  
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processes in combination with doing a sample may alleviate some of the 
risks that would occur from not looking at a greater number.
48
 
1.48 Electronic Frontiers Australia expressed its support for the introduction of a 
better oversight and reporting regime in relation to access to telecommunications data: 
We also support calls for more detailed reporting of access to data…We 
also see no reason why access to communications data by intelligence 
agencies should not be reported…at least on a statistical basis. We cannot 
see any harm in doing that. We agree that there needs to be more effective 
external and independent oversight of this process. We would also suggest 
that there need to be very clear rules about what happens to data that has 
been accessed through this process, how long it is retained by the agencies 
and how it is disposed of and so forth.
49
 
1.49 The Chair notes that the government has proposed changes to the oversight 
arrangements for accessing telecommunications data by authorisation in the Bill 
currently before Parliament. This is discussed in more detail later. 
Should access to 'telecommunications data' require a warrant? 
1.50 It is widely considered that there is a need to review the threshold for access 
to telecommunications data accessed without a warrant. Some witnesses suggested to 
the committee that the need for such a review in the context of a legislative framework 
mandating retention of defined data attributes has become even more important. For 
example, the Australian Privacy Foundation explained: 
In terms of metadata, I think it is easy, when we say 'All metadata should be 
covered by warrants', for the law enforcement agencies to come back and 
say, 'That's completely ridiculous; it's administratively impossible for us to 
go for warrants for all of those 320,000 authorisations.' I think one of the 
questions that needs to be asked is: how many of those are just for customer 
name and address? I do not think any of us are suggesting that you should 
have to go for a warrant just to say to a telco, 'Do you have a customer 
Nigel Waters?' So, we could get rid of that sort of furphy and say that 
maybe 50 or 60 per cent of requests are in that category and that it is no 
different from any other business that the police might go to and ask for 
customer information. But when you get into the details of their billing 
records, their transactions and all the other associated metadata, then it is 
our position that that should be subject to the warrant regime.
50
  
1.51 This view was supported by Electronic Frontiers Australia: 
We support the implementation of a warrant process for access to metadata 
in any substantive form…outside of simple customer information. We do 
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23 April 2014, p. 29. 
49  Mr Jon Lawrence, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2014, p. 36. 
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not think there is a need for wider access to that, but for anything involving 
any substantive amount of metadata we would certainly support that.
51
  
1.52 The MEAA explained that it agreed with the extension of the warrant regime 
to data which is 'information that allows a communication to occur',
52
 on the basis that 
such an approach would provide valuable protections for journalists: 
Clearly, being required to get a warrant-anything that raises the bar to 
access this information is obviously very valuable. It also would then 
require them [law enforcement agencies] to answer certain questions that a 
judge would have to ask under the Evidence Act in terms of confidentiality 
of sources. For example, if you are seeking a warrant to get metadata about 
a particular journalist's phone, then they [the agency] would also have to 
jump through the hoops under the shield laws.
53
  
1.53 Calls for requiring access to telecommunications data to be restricted via 
warrant or changes to the definition of 'enforcement agency' are largely the result of 
changes to metadata brought about by advancing technologies and the view of 
stakeholders that in many circumstances, metadata should be regarded as the 
equivalent of content.
54
As a result, it is in this context that the debate around accessing 
metadata via an authorisation, rather than warrant needs to be had.  
1.54 This section outlined the existing legislative framework that provides for 
enforcement agencies to access telecommunications data by means of an 
authorisation. It discussed evidence received which indicated that information 
captured as telecommunications data today is far greater and more revealing than the 
information which was available when the Act was first introduced pointing to a need 
for reform. Reform of access to telecommunications data becomes even more 
important in light of calls for mandatory data retention, which is discussed in in the 
next section of these additional comments. 
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Chair's views and recommendations: existing regime for 
authorising access to telecommunications data  
1.55 The Chair's views and recommendations set out below are made in respect of 
his findings on the current form of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 (TIA Act).  
1.56 The Chair acknowledges the enormous complexity involved in updating 
telecommunications interception legislation and recognises that the issues involved 
are technical and challenging. In forming these recommendations, the Chair has been 
guided by the underlying premise that the individual right to privacy must be balanced 
with the need to ensure community safety and national security. However, there are 
difficult compromises to be struck between these competing rights, as well as a range 
of practical considerations affecting both law enforcement agencies and 
telecommunications providers. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the existing 
TIA Act is complex and difficult to navigate; it should be re-written.  
1.57 The need for reform has arisen as a result of piecemeal amendments over a 
35 year period. Although these legislative changes sought to respond to the needs of 
law enforcement and anti-corruption bodies, they have not sufficiently considered the 
impact of parallel advancements in technology.  
1.58 Evidence to the committee clearly illustrated that ad-hoc reform in the 
absence of consideration of changing technologies has resulted in a regime 
characterised by complexity, duplication and, in some cases, inadequate oversight and 
privacy protections. Moreover, it has led to an inexorable creep in the range of 
agencies permitted to access intercepted material and the purposes for which they are 
permitted to do so. As a result, the Chair considers that comprehensive reform of the 
telecommunications legislation is required, particularly so the legislation is  
well-placed to deal with the continued evolution of telecommunications technology 
and usage. Continued piecemeal amendment of the existing TIA Act is not feasible. 
1.59 The Chair sees merit in the introduction of a single attribute-based warrant 
regime for content and metadata that is 'information that allows a communication to 
occur', but notes that a carefully considered definition of the attributes included and an 
appropriate proportionality test is required.  
1.60 The introduction of a single attribute-based warrant regime should be coupled 
with the introduction of a Commonwealth public interest monitor and a review of the 
oversight regime governing both warranted and warrantless access. The Law Council 
of Australia provided examples of specific legislative changes that could be 
incorporated which the Chair considers would address the concerns of stakeholders in 
respect of oversight of the warranted access regime.
55
 The Chair recommends that 
consideration be given to the evidence taken during this inquiry regarding the design 
of a single attribute-based warrant regime.  
                                              
55  Law Council of Australia, Supplementary Submission 34, p. 2. 
41 
 
1.61 The Chair agrees with calls for an objects clause clearly articulating the 
purpose of the Act and its dual objectives of providing access to communications 
content and data to enable the investigation of serious crime and threats to national 
security and protecting the privacy of communications.  
1.62 The Chair was persuaded that the introduction of a Commonwealth Public 
Interest Monitor, serving a similar role to that played in Queensland and Victoria, 
would help ensure that the introduction of attribute-based warrants does not reduce 
privacy protections under the existing regime. 
Recommendation 1 
1.63 The Chair recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to include an objects clause modelled on Article 17 
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the privacy 
principles contained in the Privacy Act 1988. 
Recommendation 2 
1.64 The Chair recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be comprehensively redrafted to enact a single  
attribute-based warrant regime applying to content and data that is 'information 
that allows a communication to occur'. Warrants under that regime should be 
limited to the investigation by law enforcement, anti-corruption or national 
security agencies of:  
 serious criminal activity; or  
 activity that may have serious and immediate implications for national 
security. 
1.65 'Basic subscriber data' would continue to be accessed by enforcement 
agencies via the authorisation regime. 
Recommendation 3 
1.66 The Chair recommends that the Telecommunication (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 should be amended to establish a Commonwealth Public 
Interest Monitor to have oversight of the warrant regime under the Act. 
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Mandatory data retention 
This section examines the policy of mandatory data retention in the context of the 
government's proposed regime set out in the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014. The terms 'telecommunications data' 
and 'metadata' are used interchangeably. 
Background 
1.67 In 2012, when requesting that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) undertake an inquiry into a package of potential 
reforms to Australia's national security legislation, the then Attorney-General directed 
the PJCIS to consider: 
Applying tailored data retention periods for up to 2 years for part of a data 
set, with specific timeframes taking into account agency priorities and 
privacy and cost impacts.
56
 
1.68 In its June 2013 report, the PJCIS stated that it had 'grappled with the issue of 
how best to reconcile the important national security interests…and on the other 
hand…the very significant alteration of the relationship between the state and the 
citizen, which the introduction of such a regime would arguably involve'.
57
 That 
committee did not form a view on the need for the introduction of mandatory data 
retention, but rather, stated that the matter should be left for government.
58
  
1.69 On 30 October 2014, the Abbott Government introduced the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 
2014 (Bill) into the House of Representatives.
59
 On introducing the Bill, the Minister 
for Communications explained: 
The bill contains a package of reforms to prevent the further degradation of 
the investigative capabilities of Australia's law enforcement and national 
security agencies. The bill will require companies providing 
telecommunications services in Australia, carriers and internet service 
providers to keep a limited, prescribed set of telecommunications data for 
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two years. The bill amends the Telecommunications Interception and 
Access Act 1979…and the Telecommunications Act 1997…60 
1.70 The proposed mandatory data retention regime set out in the Bill would 
introduce a requirement that telecommunication service providers in Australia retain 
telecommunications data (metadata) for a period of two years. Rather than define 
'telecommunications data', the Bill would 'allow regulations to prescribe a consistent, 
minimum set of records that service providers who provide services in Australia must 
keep for two years'.
61
 Under the Bill, content and web browsing data would be 
specifically excluded from the retention requirement.
62
  
1.71 The Bill also proposes a new definition of 'enforcement agency' and 'criminal 
law enforcement agency' for the purposes of existing Chapter 4 (accessing 
telecommunications data) and Chapter 3 (in relation to preservation notices) of the 
TIA Act. The proposed definitions, which would seek to limit the number of agencies 
that can access this data, include the introduction of a ministerial discretion that would 
enable the Minister to declare an agency to be an 'enforcement agency' or 'criminal 
law enforcement agency' for the purposes of the Act.
63
 
1.72 In addition, the Bill proposes the introduction of a new oversight regime for 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman where the Ombudsman would oversee the 
authorisation regime, including an obligation to report annually on the regime to the 
Minister and the Parliament.
64
 
Why is mandatory data retention being proposed? 
1.73 Telecommunications data is generally collected as a matter of course by 
carriers and carriage service providers in the provision of communication services. 
This information has traditionally been used for billing purposes. However, as 
technology and the way in which services are provided has changed, this data is no 
longer always required for business purposes and in some instances is not being 
retained at all. This has led to calls, primarily from national security and law 
enforcement agencies, for the introduction of a mandatory data retention regime. It 
also explains the view of those agencies that, what would be required is not the 
introduction of a new obligation, but rather the mandating of data to ensure 
consistency in the data set retained, both in terms of data and the period of retention. 
This is reflected in the Bill currently before Parliament.  
1.74 In his second reading speech the Minister explained the government's view of 
the vital role of metadata to public and national security: 
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Access to metadata plays a central role in almost every counterterrorism, 
counterespionage, cybersecurity and organised crime investigation. It is 
also used in almost all serious criminal investigations, including 
investigations into murder, serious sexual assaults, drug trafficking and 
kidnapping. The use of this kind of metadata, therefore, is not new. 
However, as the business models of service providers are changing with 
technology they are keeping fewer records. And they are keeping those 
records for shorter periods of time because they do not need them any 
longer, in many cases, for billing. Many of the records that are still kept are 
kept because of legacy systems put in place years ago. In June 2013, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security concluded that 
this diminution in the retention of metadata is harming law enforcement and 
national security capabilities, and that these changes are accelerating.
65
 
1.75 Throughout its inquiry the committee received much evidence from law 
enforcement agencies indicating universal support for the introduction of mandatory 
data retention for the reasons cited by the Minister. For example, the Board of the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC), in stating its support for a regime that required 
data to be retained for a 'uniform length of time across all telecommunication service 
providers', explained: 
Telecommunications data is an effective and efficient tool used by law 
enforcement to identify and investigate organised criminal activity and 
serious crime and reveal the true extent of a criminal network which would 
otherwise remain unknown.
66
 
1.76 Victoria Police, another advocate for mandatory data retention, voiced strong 
support for the implementation of such a regime 'given the changes in the patterns of 
community usage of mobile phones (being that many persons use mobile phones daily 
and frequently for conversations or internet access) and changes in industry business 
practices'. Victoria Police added: 
…in many instances, carriers only retain data for commercial purposes such 
as billing. Data which is of interest to law enforcement is often not retained. 
Where data is retained, it is for varying periods of time. The community 
expectation for criminal activity to be sufficiently investigated and 
prosecuted justifies data retention to mitigate the risk that evidence will be 
unavailable.
67
 
1.77 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) also 
supported calls for mandatory data retention: 
ACLEI sees merit in a legislated data retention requirement on 
telecommunications service providers, which would provide clarity as to 
how long a period of time service providers will retain telecommunications 
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data, and ensure that such data can be properly accessed for law 
enforcement purposes. This data is already in the possession of service 
providers for their usual business practices, such as billing, which is 
generally destroyed after a short period of time.
68
 
1.78 ACLEI provided an example of how the lack of a mandatory data retention 
regime had affected its ability to investigate corruption: 
In a recent ACLEI corruption investigation, it appeared that sensitive 
information about a law enforcement agency may have been unlawfully 
disclosed to a third party by use of an anonymous website contact form. 
ACLEI was able to identify the IP address of the computer from which the 
alleged unlawful disclosure had been made, but when ACLEI sought to 
match the IP address to a particular internet user, the relevant internet 
service provider advised that—in accordance with usual business 
practices—the information had been destroyed when it was no longer 
necessary. 
There were no other means available to ACLEI to match the IP address to a 
person. If the service provider had been under an obligation to keep its 
telecommunications data for more than a few months, the data might have 
been available to ACLEI for the purposes of the corruption investigation.
69
 
1.79 Despite widespread support among law enforcement and national security 
agencies for the introduction of mandatory data retention, concerns have been 
consistently raised since such a regime was first mooted, and again, following the 
release of the government's proposed legislation in late October 2014. Concerns are 
generally related to the following three themes: 
 the scope of the proposed mandatory data retention regime; 
 the cost involved; and 
 the privacy implications of implementing a two year retention regime. 
1.80 These matters are addressed below in the context of the government's 
proposed regime. 
Scope of the proposed mandatory data retention regime 
1.81 Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bill seeks to insert a new Part 5-1A into Chapter 5 
of the TIA Act.
70
 Proposed Division 1 of Part 5-1A sets out the scope of the proposed 
mandatory data retention regime. 
1.82 Proposed new section 187A contains the obligation on service providers to 
keep 'information of a kind prescribed by regulations, or documents containing 
information of that kind'
71
 for the period prescribed by proposed new section 187C 
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and identifies that the kinds of information that would be required to be retained by 
regulations must relate to one or more of the following matters:  
(a) characteristics of any of the following:  
(i) the subscriber of a relevant service;  
(ii) an account relating to a relevant service;  
(iii) a telecommunications device relating to a relevant service; 
(iv) another relevant service relating to a relevant service;  
(b) the source of a communication;  
(c) the destination of a communication;  
(d) the date, time and duration of a communication, or of its connection to a 
relevant service;  
(e) the type of a communication, or a type of relevant service used in 
connection with a communication; 
(f) the location of equipment, or a line, used in connection with a 
communication.
72
  
1.83 The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Bill sets out that 
telecommunications data would not be defined in the TIA Act so as to remain 
technology-neutral and that a 'regulation-making power is required to ensure that the 
legislative framework gives service providers sufficient technical detail about their 
data retention obligations while remaining flexible enough to adapt to future changes 
in communication technology'.
73
 
1.84 The EM further explains 'data retention will create a consistent obligation for 
record-keeping across the telecommunications industry' and that although '[s]ome 
service providers may initially need to modify their systems to ensure they meet this 
minimum standard': 
The minimum obligation imposed by this legislation is consistent with the 
types of data and subscriber information currently held by service providers 
for billing, quality assurance and other business purposes.
74
 
1.85 Proposed new section 187B identifies service providers that would be exempt 
from the data retention obligations proposed under section 187A(1). The purpose of 
proposed new section 187B: 
…will be to ensure that entities such as governments, universities and 
corporations will not be required to retain telecommunications data in 
relation to their own internal networks (provided these services are not 
offered to the general public), and that providers of communications 
services in a single place, such as free Wi-Fi access in cafes and restaurants 
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are not required to retain telecommunications data in relation to those 
services. However, the [Communications Access Co-ordinator] CAC can 
declare that data from such services must nevertheless be retained.
75
 
1.86 The mandatory data retention regime being proposed by the government's Bill 
has been criticised on the basis that the: 
 term 'telecommunications data' remains unclear;  
 costs of implementing such a regime remain unknown; and 
 retention period being proposed is arbitrary and further undermines privacy. 
1.87 There has, however, been widespread support for the inclusion in the Bill of a 
revised definition of 'enforcement agency' (which would have the effect of limiting the 
number of agencies who can access telecommunications data via authorisation), and 
the proposed introduction of an oversight regime in respect of telecommunications 
data.  
What is telecommunications data? 
1.88 Many submitters contended that due to changes in technology, metadata 
(telecommunications data) should now be regarded as content. They contend that the 
definition of 'telecommunications data' should take this into account. Mr Steve Dalby, 
the Chief Regulatory Officer at internet service provider iiNet Limited, explained how 
the analogy of the 'envelope and the letter' no longer holds up: 
The complex, voluminous, often sensitive and private nature of the data 
sought under a mandatory data retention regime exposes the hollowness of 
the claim that communications data or metadata is 'just like the envelope 
without its contents'. The difficulty with such a poor analogy is that it 
attempts to compare a piece of paper, the envelope, with a chain of events 
and multiple links to myriad other data, meticulously described and 
recorded. In the case of Twitter, this may include who wrote the tweet, their 
biography, their location, when it was written, how many other tweets have 
been written on that user's account, where the author was when the tweet 
was posted, what time it was, whom it was sent to, where the author is 
normally based and, surprisingly in the case of Twitter, the 140 characters 
of the content of the tweet as well.
76
 
1.89 Mr Dalby further explained to the committee that as metadata 'underlies all 
communications': 
It is fundamentally misleading to downplay the degree of intrusion of data 
retention regimes such as those that operate at the European directive level. 
A false assertion is that such regimes do not include the actual content of 
what our customers might be communicating. These inaccurate distinctions 
are dangerous and inappropriate. It is misleading to assert that such data is 
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'only metadata' or 'just metadata'. Metadata reveals even more about an 
individual than the content itself.
77
 
1.90 Blueprint for Free Speech raised similar concerns that it is:  
…easy to try to triangulate information about a particular person, or to 
imply particular activities or conduct, purely from metadata. If you have 
enough of it you can build a story and then imply context, which is in itself 
dangerous.
78
 
1.91 Electronic Frontiers Australia agreed with the view that 'metadata is often a 
proxy for content': 
We also strongly disagree with the assertion that metadata is less invasive 
than providing access to content. As the Attorney-General's Department 
itself admitted in its submission:…telecommunications data can contain 
particularly sensitive personal information justifying special legal 
protection. We completely and wholeheartedly agree with that. Clearly, it 
can be used to build a picture of a target, their network of associates, where 
they shop, where they eat, where they sleep…79 
1.92 Mr Lawrence also cited the following research by David Seidler who made 
the following point about data retention:  
Although on its face, metadata might appear anonymised and trivial, the 
development of big data analysis techniques (for which metadata is "perfect 
fodder") means that the insights it provides after manipulation might well 
meet this definition—of being content, that is.80 
1.93 More dramatically, Ms Lindy Stephens, Global Director of People Operations 
at ThoughtWorks, cited former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National 
Security Agency (NSA) Director General Michael Hayden as having said, 'We kill 
people based on metadata'.
81
 Ms Stephens also referred the committee to statements 
made by former NSA General Counsel Mr Stewart Baker that 'metadata absolutely 
tells you everything you need to know about somebody's life. If you have enough 
metadata, you don't really need content'.
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1.94 Industry groups cautioned the committee in respect of the potential privacy 
impacts on consumers of data retention. AMTA submitted that: 
[A] data retention scheme will involve an increased risk to the privacy of 
Australians and provide an incentive to hackers and criminals. Data 
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retention is at odds with the prevailing policy to maximise and protect 
privacy and minimise the data held by organisations. 
Industry believes it is generally preferable for consumers that 
telecommunications service providers retain the least amount of data 
necessary to provision, maintain and bill for services.
83
 
1.95 The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) also outlined its 
opposition to mandatory data retention explaining that it was particularly apprehensive 
as to how such a regime would affect the free press: 
The inevitable impact of collection, storage and surveillance through 
metadata is that it will be impossible for a journalist to liaise with a source, 
for a source to connect with a journalist or for a journalist to connect with a 
source without it being be able to be found and be identified, without them 
going through quite extraordinary encryption processes—and, even there, I 
think there is probably a question mark over how effective that would be.
84
 
The need for a definition of 'telecommunications data' in the primary legislation 
1.96 Throughout the duration of the committee's 15 month inquiry, stakeholders 
consistently raised the need for a clear definition of 'telecommunications data' to be 
legislated, particularly in the event of the government seeking to implement 
mandatory data retention.  
1.97 Dr Roger Clarke of the Australian Privacy Foundation identified the 
complexity of defining metadata, explaining to the committee:  
The term 'metadata'…derives from the library sphere. It is data about data, 
and it has gradually been absorbed into discussions about the internet, 
because obviously librarianship has moved on to the internet during the last 
20 years…It merely means data about data. That is the only consolidated 
meaning that it has. With respect to any given communication, your answer 
as to what is metadata and what is content will be different. There is not one 
answer to: what is metadata? There are 40 or 50 answers and, in fact, some 
of them can be disputed at length. That has been lost in this debate. 
Everybody is assuming that metadata is a thing that can be legislated for. It 
is not technologically neutral. It is absolutely unclear what metadata will 
mean in each of these different contexts.
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1.98 Other submitters also acknowledged the complexity of defining 
'telecommunications data', and they too cited the importance of clearly defining the 
term. Mr Alastair MacGibbon, Director of the Centre for Internet Safety at the 
University of Canberra, explained: 
…defining metadata is…clearly the critical thing. What information do we 
consider to be metadata, in terms of the legislation, and what do we not? 
Once that distinction is made it becomes a much clearer picture, though it 
may not satisfy everyone. Metadata is anything and everything that you are 
really gathering; it is information from the use of technology.
86
  
1.99 Electronic Frontiers Australia was of a similar view: 
It is clearly a pretty critical starting point that we get a clear definition of 
metadata. In the telephonic context it is fairly straightforward, but if we go 
beyond that into non-telephonic communications we have some very 
serious concerns that it is even technically feasible to effectively separate 
metadata from content, particularly in the case of email communications.
87
  
1.100 Although stakeholders explained the need for a clear definition of 
'telecommunications data' on the basis that clarity is required to ensure certainty for 
industry, protect privacy, and enable the costs of mandatory data retention to be 
accurately forecast, the Bill currently before the Parliament, while identifying the 
categories of information that metadata might include, relies on regulations to set out 
the specific details.  
1.101 The Attorney-General's Department (department) explained that this approach 
had been taken to ensure the legislation remains technology neutral: 
The regulations provide an ability to update the dataset in the event that it is 
required due to changes in telecommunications services and the 
fundamental nature of those, and industry have told us consistently that the 
industries are evolving at a rapid rate and there is considerable change on 
the horizon. The inclusion of the dataset in regulations provides an ability 
to update the dataset whilst ensuring it is limited to the six key categories 
include on the face of the bill.
88
 
1.102 Despite the department's explanation, the approach of delegating the 
substance of the Bill to subordinate legislation has been criticised by many 
stakeholders, many reiterating the need for a definition to be included in the primary 
legislation.
89
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1.103 The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) stated that in its view, the 
delegation of the definition of telecommunications data to regulations was 
inappropriate: 
The Law Council's Rule of Law Principles require that where legislation 
allows for the Executive to issue subordinate legislation in the form of 
regulations, the scope of that delegated authority should be carefully 
confined and remain subject to Parliamentary supervision. Such a 
requirement ensures that Executive powers are defined by law, such that it 
is not left to the Executive to determine for itself what powers it has and 
when and how they may be used. As a matter of good legislative practice, 
significant matters should be specified in primary legislation which 
generally undergoes extensive consultation, not potentially subject to 
change by Ministerial decision and regulation.
90
  
1.104 The Law Council further set out why it considered it inappropriate for the data 
set to be defined in regulations:  
The categories of information which should be captured by the scheme will 
raise significant questions of policy and have very substantial financial, as 
well as privacy, implications. The 'kinds of information' (within defined 
categories) that might be required to be captured and kept are uncertain. 
Although the Government has provided an initial proposal (in the form of a 
draft Regulation) the data set is still in draft form and can be changed at any 
time. Given that service providers can be subjected to civil penalties for 
failing to comply with obligations under the scheme (see for example 
section 187M) and the impact of the scheme on individuals, the Law 
Council considers that it is inappropriate for the kind of 
telecommunications data to be prescribed by regulations. Both the 
categories of the data to be retained and the specific data set should be set 
out in the Bill itself.
91
  
1.105 In addition, the Law Council cited the report of the Scrutiny of Bills 
Committee which stated that 'paragraph 187A(1)(a)…inappropriately delegate[d] 
legislative power'
92
 and accordingly, made the following recommendations: 
- The Bill should clearly define the types of telecommunications data and 
the specific data set to be retained. 
- The power to prescribe by way of regulation the mandatory data set 
should be removed from the Bill. 
- The Bill should define the distinction between the 'content and 
substance' of a communication (referred to in clause 187(4)(a) of the 
Bill), as opposed to 'telecommunications data'.
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1.106 A similar concern was raised by the Australian Human Rights Commission 
(AHRC) in its submission to the PJCIS inquiry. In its submission, the AHRC, while 
acknowledging the rationale for using regulations, stated that: 
…the definition of telecommunications data is a critical feature of the Bill 
and should not be left to be described by Regulations. The Commission 
considers that the telecommunications data required to be retained by 
telecommunication services providers should be included in the legislation 
itself.
94
  
The cost of data retention 
1.107 Throughout its inquiry the committee sought to establish the costs that would 
be involved should the government proceed with its plan to introduce mandatory data 
retention. At the committee's final public hearing on 2 February 2015 and after the 
introduction of the Bill, the department was unable to provide any indication to the 
committee of the possible cost of a mandatory data retention regime to taxpayers. In 
fact, in response to questioning as to whether or not the Parliament will know how 
much the scheme will cost before the Bill is debated, the department advised: 
That will ultimately be a matter for the Attorney and the government…As 
with all budgetary matters, it is a matter for the budget process and the 
government and the cabinet.
95
 
1.108 On introducing the Bill, the Minister stated: 
There has also been a great deal of conjecture about how much data 
retention may cost…the government is committed to ongoing, good faith 
consultation with industry and expects to make a substantial contribution to 
both the cost of implementation and the operation of this scheme.
96
 
1.109 On 18 February 2015, the Prime Minister, the Hon Tony Abbott MP, was 
quoted as saying that 'keeping the data would cost less than $400 million a year'.
97
 In 
its report tabled on 27 February 2015, the PJCIS set out that '[i]ndicative costing 
estimates for industry's implementation of the data retention scheme, based on 
PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis, suggested that the upfront capital cost of the regime 
would be between $188.8 million and $319.1 million'.
98
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1.110 Throughout the course of its inquiry, the committee did however receive 
evidence from industry participants of the predicted costs associated with the 
implementation of such a regime. The committee heard that the lack of clarity around 
what was being proposed, and therefore the costs that the imposition of a mandatory 
data retention regime may have for industry participants, were of great concern. The 
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) and Communications 
Alliance explained industry's apprehension and its views in relation to these matters as 
follows: 
…the cost of retaining data beyond any period it would be retained in the 
normal course of business must be borne by the agencies that require it. 
Similarly, any costs in relation to security, storage and ability to search 
retained data must also be borne by the agencies that require it. The 
Associations note that keeping more data or keeping data for longer 
periods, may add to costs significantly whereas the added benefits may be 
incremental, at best. 
…The costs of acquiring and retaining particular items of data will vary 
widely, as will the benefits to [law enforcement and national security 
agencies] LENSAs.
99
 
1.111 iiNet Limited (iiNet) advised the committee that the cost of implementing 
data retention to its organisation could be as high as '$100 million and growing over 
time as data grows': 
[$60 million] was our first-year cost, which we calculated…18 months ago. 
We have done some maths since then and we have seen the proliferation of 
metadata on websites and other places doubling every 18 months to two 
years, so our costs would increase. I know the cost of storage is coming 
down, but we believe that doubling every two years of the volume of data 
that would need to be collected would mean that this would be an ongoing 
increase. We are now talking more in the order of $100 million for that first 
two-year period of data collection…and growing over time as that data 
grows. And then there is another potential cost on top. If the suggestion is 
that content is not required—that somebody will be required to process the 
metadata that is collected to strip out the content—that would be petabytes 
of data a day for our own organisation. You would need supercomputers to 
extract that data …The cost of storage might go down a fraction, but if we 
have to store it in the first place and then redact it it is just costs upon 
costs.
100
 
1.112 AMTA explained that it had previously identified the potential costs of data 
retention to industry as more than $500 million for 'a new scheme around network 
infrastructure security and potentially high costs for industry around online copyright 
enforcement': 
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…in this day and age information flows are not only huge but increasing in 
some spaces exponentially. They are also borderless in the sense that all of 
us on a daily basis I am sure traverse many websites and destinations 
outside of Australia...To give you a picture: data volumes in the mobile 
space alone are predicted to increase by a factor of 10 between 2013 and 
2019. Should we have to build a system to retain data for a lengthy period, 
it is not just as simple as pushing a button or tapping an existing resource; 
in actual fact we would have to duplicate the data. That duplication would 
be required because this data comes from a multitude of IT systems within 
carriers. To be helpful to law enforcement agencies, it would need to be 
duplicated and aggregated. Then we have to store it…Then we have to 
manage it and be able to interrogate it. There are the privacy and security 
issues that go with that. All of these things are very considerable issues to 
address.
101
 
1.113 iiNet suggested that these costs could end up being passed on to customers, 
but added that until it is clear what the legislation would require it would be difficult 
to calculate the ultimate cost: 
We originally calculated the $60 million to be an increase of about $5 per 
month per customer if we just passed the costs through…we are very 
confused about what is required so it is very difficult for us to calculate 
what the costs will be. If we are only required to keep routine metadata for 
telephone calls we can probably pack up today and not speak again. If, 
however, the confidential briefing paper that was provided by the Attorney-
General's Department is to be interpreted the way we have then yes, there 
will be massive costs.
102
 
1.114 Mr Chris Althaus, Chief Executive Officer of AMTA made similar comments 
in relation to consumers: 
[T]he costs issue remains a very significant one for industry. All of the 
matters that relate to interception, and the extension perhaps into a data 
retention regime, come at significant cost. Industry has to shoulder its 
burden in that respect, but so too will there be an impost through to 
consumers, and, we believe, a necessary impost on government. Schemes 
elsewhere around the world have frequently seen the role of government in 
funding the establishment of schemes and the national security and law-
enforcement agencies paying to use those schemes. That is certainly an 
issue for consideration in this current debate.  
We are going to incur significant costs. Data gathering through a range of 
currently disaggregated systems within service providers will need to be 
serviced by a new system, a new capacity. And of course there is significant 
and ongoing uncertainty around many aspects of that. A lot of those aspects 
are what we will perhaps describe as a work in progress.
103
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1.115 Industry submitters consistently explained to the committee that the costs 
from the introduction of a mandatory data retention regime would not be from storage 
of the data but rather the systems to extract the data and the security that would need 
to be built to protect the data once stored. For example, Mr James Shaw, Director of 
Government Relations at Telstra, explained: 
…quite often the focus seems to be around the storage of the data…but that 
is only a very small part of it. In fact, in terms of the costs of the scheme, it 
is probably one of the lesser elements of it. There is the whole process of 
extracting the data from the network, and the data that is being looked at in 
the context of this regime comes from various network elements. It is not 
located in one central server within the network. There is a variety of 
platforms generating different types of data in different formats. That has to 
be extracted. It then has to be managed and stored, and at the same time it 
has to be secured. Then it has to be made available in a form that the 
agencies can usefully use. Then, finally, and most importantly, at the end it 
has to be disposed of in a way that satisfies the concerns of customers that 
this data is not hanging around for any longer than is required. So they are 
all steps in or elements of an overall data retention scheme. You cannot 
divorce one from the other, but they are separate considerations in how you 
go about building the scheme.
104
 
1.116 Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public Policy at 
Vodafone Hutchison Australia, was of a similar view: 
The storage component is relatively straightforward to expand. Where the 
costs are is in the capability to retrieve the information from a very large 
data set. That is where the costs will kick in as you lengthen the amount of 
time.
105
 
1.117 However, Mr Alastair MacGibbon suggested to the committee that in his 
experience, the 'cost argument is often overblown'. He explained: 
Given the ability to compress information and the cost of the actual devices 
for storing information, the cost of storage has gone down exponentially 
and will continue to do so over the years. I think the biggest cost is 
probably in architecting their systems to collect information. In many 
respects they are compelled to at the moment anyway under the current 
telecommunications interception act requirements. 
…The reason why cost should not be an argument in compelling some of 
these ISPs and telcos to store information is that, as I say, they are currently 
obliged to have themselves architected in certain ways…106 
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1.118 ThoughtWorks raised the concern that data retention could in fact have more 
far-reaching impacts, directly affecting the bottom line of some businesses as 
consumers seek out companies that provide greater privacy protections: 
As an Australian business we are concerned that we will see this impact on 
our industry here in Australia that the US has seen. Essentially, we are 
talking about customers choosing to store their information in another 
country because they are concerned about the laws in the US and the 
subversion of those laws in the US in order to access data. 
We are also concerned that if we have stronger laws here that we will lose 
business. In particular, for things like cloud providers—organisations that 
store data for other companies—where there has been the biggest impact. 
But there were all sorts of impacts across the board. Cisco, who make 
routers and other things that direct internet traffic, saw a decline in their top 
markets of between 18 and 30 per cent. So we are seeing real impacts on 
business already, particularly in the US, and it comes from a lack of trust by 
customers.
107
 
Privacy implications of the proposed data retention period 
1.119 In contrast to the calls by law enforcement agencies for the implementation of 
a mandatory data retention regime, many stakeholders raised concerns in respect of 
privacy and the proposed regime, particularly the prescribed retention period of two 
years. It was suggested that the introduction of such a regime ran directly counter to 
the application of Australian Privacy Principle 3, which codifies the long-standing 
principle that personal data should not be arbitrarily captured and stored: 
The Australian privacy principles were updated and implemented just six 
months ago, yet mandatory data retention is a policy that would require the 
explicit rejection of these principles.
108
 
1.120 On introducing the Bill, the Minister explained that the two year retention 
period set out in the Bill had been determined on advice from law enforcement and 
security agencies, as well as by reference to the experiences of a number of foreign 
jurisdictions.
109 
1.121 In its submission to the PJCIS committee, the department identified that 
'[m]ore than 35 Western countries worldwide have legislative data retention schemes' 
and that the 'most widely implemented data retention scheme is the former EU Data 
Retention Directive…which imposed an obligation on companies to retain specified 
data for up to [two] years'.
110
 The evidence provided by the department to the PJCIS 
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identified that the proposed two year period is in fact at the upper limit for retaining 
data across jurisdictions.
111
 
1.122 The proposed period attracted much criticism: stakeholders were consistently 
of the view that the two-year period should be revised. In its review of the Bill, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR) stated that: 
A data retention period of two years raises the question of whether the 
period is disproportionate, and may go beyond the period necessary to 
achieve the scheme's legitimate objective. This question is resolved by 
reference to the purposes for which the data is accessed. 
For example, despite the acknowledged low frequency of use of data that is 
more than six months old, and the stated requirement for older data for 
national security and complex criminal offences, the scheme does not limit 
access to data which is older than six months to the investigation of national 
security and complex criminal offences.
112
 
1.123 This conclusion led the PJCHR to request 'further advice of the  
Attorney-General as to whether the two year retention period is necessary and 
proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate objective'.
113
  
1.124 Similarly, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) raised concerns 
in respect of the two year retention period noting that: 
In the landmark decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
[EU], which invalidated the EU Data Retention Directive, the Court 
identified several characteristics of the Directive that rendered the regime a 
disproportionate interference with the rights to privacy. Relevantly, the 
Court considered that retention periods should be limited to that which is 
'strictly necessary'. Further, retention schemes should distinguish between 
the usefulness of different kinds of data and tailor retention periods to the 
objective pursued or the persons concerned.
114
 
1.125 The AHRC drew attention to an evaluation report on the EU Data Retention 
Directive in 2011 that 'only 2 per cent of requested data was over [one] year old across 
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the European Union' and noted that as the majority of EU countries (including the 
United Kingdom) have a one year retention period 'an initial retention period of [one] 
year would be a more proportionate interference with the right to privacy'.
115
  
1.126 The Australian Privacy Commissioner stated that any data retention scheme 
'should only require service providers to retain telecommunications data for the 
minimum amount of time necessary to meet those needs'.
116
 The Law Council made a 
similar recommendation stating that the 'data retention period should be reduced to no 
longer than the minimal period required by law enforcement and security agencies'.
117
 
1.127 The Internet Society of Australia (ISOC-AU) outlined that in its view unless 
there is 'appropriate technology standards metadata should not be retained beyond 
strict business need': 
Where metadata is retained there need to be the strictest standards around 
retention and access. I cannot reinforce that enough. Should access to 
metadata be granted, considerably higher standards of access and oversight 
of these processes need to be implemented, including penalties for the 
breaches of these sorts of standards…Certain things need to be built into the 
equipment and the application so that we can do this in a clear and 
consistent manner with appropriate levels of control.
118
 
1.128 The telecommunications industry was also of the opinion that the case for a 
two year data retention period had not been made:  
Industry is, however, far from convinced that a two year retention period 
for IP related data is either necessary, justifiable, cost-effective, or in the 
public interest…and 12 months. For internet-related data there is only one 
country – Poland – that appears to be heading down the path of a 2 year 
retention period – and that regime is under challenge. 
We know that in UK, for example, over a recent 4 year period, 74%+ of 
disclosures to law enforcement agencies, where the age of data being 
sought was known, related to data that was less than 3 months old…. 
[communication service providers] CSPs report that the vast majority of 
warrantless requests they receive from Australian agencies relate to data 
that is 6 months old or younger…119  
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1.129 AMTA and the Communications Alliance suggested that rather than the two 
year period proposed by the Bill, a '[six] month period would be an appropriate 
minimum time to require the retention of internet-related data' and: 
It might be useful to incorporate within the Bill a requirement for agencies 
to periodically report to Parliament the number of requests (including 
distinguishing between a request relating to an individual and requests 
relating to groups of people) that have been placed with CSPs for retained 
data that was generated in the preceding 3 month period, 3-6 month period, 
6-12 month period, 12-18 month period and 18-24 month period.
120
 
No destruction requirement 
1.130 Concerns were also raised in relation to the absence of a legislative 
requirement for data captured by the proposed regime to be destroyed.  
1.131 On 12 March 2014, the updated Australian Privacy Principles (APP's) came 
into force, binding government agencies and other organisations to uphold high-level 
privacy practices.  
1.132 Notably, for the purposes of data retention, APP 3 states, in part, that an: 
[E]ntity must not collect personal information… unless the information is 
reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the entity's 
functions or activities.
121
 
1.133 APP 11 prescribes that an entity must: 
[T]ake such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the 
[personal] information [it holds] from misuse, interference and loss; and 
from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure [and that if an entity 
holding personal information about an individual] no longer needs the 
information for any purpose for which the information may be used or 
disclosed by the entity…the entity must take such steps as are reasonable in 
the circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that the 
information is de-identified.
122
  
1.134 Although the existing TIA Act contains a destruction requirement for 
restricted records and telecommunications content
123
 it does not contain a destruction 
requirement in respect of telecommunications data. The department confirmed that 
there is no destruction requirement proposed in the Bill currently before the 
Parliament: 
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…in relation to the two-year detention period is that there is no obligation 
in the bill to destroy that information after two years.
124
 
1.135 Throughout its inquiry, this aspect of the existing legislation and the proposed 
Bill was identified as an area needing reform.  
1.136 The Law Council raised this gap in the Bill as a concern given the obligations 
imposed by the APP's.
125
 Telstra also drew attention to its obligations under the 
Privacy Act suggesting that clarification was required: 
[W]e also operate under a requirement in the Privacy Act to destroy or  
de-identify data once no longer required for purposes for which they were 
collected. This could be interpreted as meaning we are legally required to 
immediately destroy or make amendments to the data retained under the 
Bill as soon as the two year retention period has ended thereby creating a 
further rolling obligation and additional cost on industry unrelated to 
commercial purposes that we have not yet factored into our assessment of 
the Bill. To help limit this impact, we believe that if there are to be different 
data retention periods across technologies as part of this scheme, we would 
recommend that telecommunication service providers be given the option 
of retaining data for the longest permitted period without breaching the 
law.
126
 
1.137 This section examined the government's announcement to introduce 
mandatory data retention and the main concerns that have been raised in relation to the 
government's proposal. The next section looks briefly at the international experience 
of those jurisdictions which have pursued mandatory data retention. 
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International developments 
1.138 Australia is not the only jurisdiction considering data retention and related 
privacy issues. However, several data retention regimes in other countries have 
recently been wound back. This section reflects on the international experience with 
mandatory data retention.  
Is international practice moving away from mandatory data retention? 
1.139 On 15 March 2006, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union issued Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks.
127
 Directive 2006/24/EC also 
amended Directive 2002/58/EC.
128
 In part, it required the European Union (EU) to: 
 retain certain categories of data
129
 (Article 3) for a period of 'not less than six 
months and not more than two years from the date of the communication' 
(Article 6); 
 ensure access to data is provided only 'to the competent national authorities in 
specific cases and in accordance with national law' and that the procedures 
and conditions followed to access the data accord with the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality as defined in each Member State's national law 
subject to EU law, public international law and 'in particular the ECHR as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human rights' (Article 4); and 
 ensure the protection and security of the data, including destroying the data at 
the end of the retention period (Article 7).
130
 
1.140 In an April 2014 ruling, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) 
found that the European Data Retention Directive was invalid. The regime was 
overturned by the ECJ on the grounds that it 'entails a wide-ranging and particularly 
serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the 
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protection of personal data, without that interference being limited to what is strictly 
necessary'.
131
   
1.141 In a statement advising of its decision, the ECJ stated that 'by requiring the 
retention of those data and by allowing the competent national authorities to access 
those data, the directive interfere[d] in a particularly serious manner with the 
fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data' and 
that 'the fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the subscriber or 
registered user being informed is likely to generate in the persons concerned a feeling 
that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance'.
132
  
1.142 The Court went on to explain that it was then for it to examine 'whether such 
an interference with the fundamental rights at issue [was] justified' and that it was of 
the opinion that: 
…by adopting the Data Retention Directive, the EU legislature has 
exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.  
In that context, the Court observe[d] that, in view of the important role 
played by the protection of personal data in the light of the fundamental 
right to respect for private life and the extent and seriousness of the 
interference with that right caused by the directive, the EU legislature’s 
discretion is reduced, with the result that review of that discretion should be 
strict. 
1.143 The Court also set out that:  
Although the retention of data required by the directive may be considered 
to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued by it, the wide-ranging 
and particularly serious interference of the directive with the fundamental 
rights at issue is not sufficiently circumscribed to ensure that that 
interference is actually limited to what is strictly necessary. 
Firstly, the directive covers, in a generalised manner, all individuals, all 
means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any 
differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the 
objective of fighting against serious crime. 
Secondly, the directive fails to lay down any objective criterion which 
would ensure that the competent national authorities have access to the data 
and can use them only for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal 
prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the extent and seriousness 
of the interference with the fundamental rights in question, may be 
considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such an interference. On the 
contrary, the directive simply refers in a general manner to 'serious crime' 
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as defined by each Member State in its national law. In addition, the 
directive does not lay down substantive and procedural conditions under 
which the competent national authorities may have access to the data and 
subsequently use them. In particular, the access to the data is not made 
dependent on the prior review by a court or by an independent 
administrative body. 
Thirdly, so far as concerns the data retention period, the directive imposes a 
period of at least six months, without making any distinction between the 
categories of data on the basis of the persons concerned or the possible 
usefulness of the data in relation to the objective pursued. Furthermore, that 
period is set at between a minimum of six months and a maximum of 24 
months, but the directive does not state the objective criteria on the basis of 
which the period of retention must be determined in order to ensure that it is 
limited to what is strictly necessary. 
The Court also finds that the directive does not provide for sufficient 
safeguards to ensure effective protection of the data against the risk of 
abuse and against any unlawful access and use of the data. It notes, inter 
alia, that the directive permits service providers to have regard to economic 
considerations when determining the level of security which they apply 
(particularly as regards the costs of implementing security measures) and 
that it does not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of 
their retention period. 
Lastly, the Court states that the directive does not require that the data be 
retained within the EU. Therefore, the directive does not fully ensure the 
control of compliance with the requirements of protection and security by 
an independent authority, as is, however, explicitly required by the Charter. 
Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential 
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data.
133
  
1.144 The Law Council explained that it shared the concerns of the ECJ and 
highlighted similarities with the proposed Australian scheme: 
I note with interest the decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union this month that struck down the data retention directive and did so 
really because of the sorts of concerns that exist in the legal profession here 
in Australia. The directive there would be similar to a law here that would 
require data to be kept for perhaps two years. One of the reasons the 
directive was struck down was that there was no real differentiation of what 
sort of data was to be kept. Data that was entirely innocent needed to be 
kept, along with data that might be likely to impact on national security 
issues or serious crime investigation issues. There was a problem about the 
length of time that data was to be kept; the proposal in each case considered 
                                              
133  http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf (accessed 
26 February 2015). 
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by the court there was six months. The risk of abuse inherent in that scheme 
seemed to be at the heart of the decision.
134
 
1.145 Despite the decision of the ECJ, the committee also received evidence from 
Australian law enforcement agencies that in their view, the decision does not 
necessarily have implications for Australia. The then Acting Chief Executive Officer 
of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) addressed some, but not all the issues 
raised by the ECJ: 
I am aware of the Court of Justice decision. I think what is important is the 
basis of that decision. There were about four key points that they referenced 
and my reading of it is that it does differentiate a little from the 
environment we have here in Australia. I would argue that in a number of 
those cases we already mitigate some of the risks that were identified. For 
example, one of the bases that the Court of Justice identified was that there 
was no protection against the risk of abuse. From my perspective, our 
oversight regime does protect from the risk of abuse. Whilst I am aware of 
the Court of Justice decision, I would equally argue that our oversight 
regime both from a legislative perspective and even a policy perspective 
differentiates from what the European Union appears to have discovered in 
their Court of Justice decision.
135
 
1.146 The department argued, that '[t]he Court's finding was not because data 
retention was inherently unconstitutional…Instead, the Court's judgment was based on 
the lack of appropriate safeguards and limits within the Directive itself…'136 and that 
although the invalidation of the Directive had resulted 'in the annulment of a number 
of data retention laws in member States where the Directive was implemented…many 
European countries [were] actively working to address the issued identified by the 
Court. For example, the then Director-General of ASIO told the committee: 
Notwithstanding the decision of the [European Court of Justice], Britain 
decided just a couple of weeks ago that they would implement that regime. 
They made no bones about why they need it. The court said it did not 
contain sufficient safeguards for implementation across EU member-states 
and the way it was framed violated the principle of proportionality under 
EU law. But it did acknowledge that data retention genuinely satisfies an 
objective of general interest, mainly the fight against serious crime and 
ultimately public security.
137
  
1.147 The then Director-General of ASIO added that: 
I suspect the debate, discussion and, indeed, legal processes in Europe are 
not yet completed. It would be wrong of us to jump to one judgement of the 
                                              
134  Mr Phillip Boulten SC, Law Council of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, 23 April 2014, 
p. 3. 
135  Mr Paul Jevtovic APM, Australian Crime Commission, Committee Hansard, 22 April 2014, 
p. 10.  
136  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 27 to the PJCIS inquiry, p. 39. 
137  Mr David Irvine, ASIO, Committee Hansard, 21 July 2014, p. 16.  
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European court in relation to one aspect of data retention to rule it out as a 
gross violation of human rights across the board.
138
 
1.148 iiNet Limited (iiNet) explained that, in its view, the shift internationally is 
away from mandatory data retention and provided examples of how various European 
jurisdictions had responded to the decision of the ECJ.
139
 The Attorney-General's 
Department (department) provided a concise summary of the data retention regimes in 
the European Union as they currently stand: the summary indicates those jurisdictions 
that have annulled mandatory data retention since the decision of the EU Court of 
Justice: 
                                              
138  Mr David Irvine, ASIO, Committee Hansard, 21 July 2014, p. 16. 
139  iiNet Limited, answer to a question taken on notice, received 11 August 2014, p. 1. 
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Source: Attorney-General's Department, submission 27 to the PJCIS inquiry, pp. 55–56. 
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1.149 The department was unable to point to any jurisdiction where the winding 
back of data retention or the requiring a warrant to access metadata had caused law 
enforcement activities to 'grind to a halt': 
CHAIR: Ms Jones, are you aware that law enforcement has not ground to a 
halt in Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania and Serbia, which are all countries that, according to 
your very helpful appendix to your submission, have some form of judicial 
oversight of telecommunications authorisations? Why do you think it would 
grind to a halt in Australia? What evidence do you have to back that up? 
Ms Jones: We have obviously been discussing this with agencies in terms 
of their operational experience of the importance of being able to access 
data information as quickly as possible early in the process. 
I note that you have listed a number of countries, but we have also looked at 
the experience in the United Kingdom, where they have recently had to 
look at the regime that they had in relation to warrants because essentially 
their operational experience was that it became virtually unworkable and 
that the number of successful authorisations was significantly reduced. 
There was a report to the UK Parliament by the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner that noted that it was causing significant 
delay in the progress of many investigations. 
CHAIR: Do you have any evidence that in any of the countries I just listed 
law enforcement has ground to a halt or that there has actually been any 
impact at all on the efficiency of law enforcement? 
Ms Jones: We have not discussed the specifics with those countries. Is there 
anything further you can add? 
Ms Harmer: No, we have not engaged directly. 
CHAIR: It is a pretty big deal to come in here and make sweeping 
statements like, 'Law enforcement will grind to a halt unless we are allowed 
to continue vast, warrantless access to telecommunications data.' It is a 
pretty big call and you have no evidence that in any of those countries that 
has been the case. 
Ms Jones: We are focused on the experience in the Australian context, on 
talking with agencies in Australia, and this is an issue that we have 
discussed before the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security. 
CHAIR: Yes, but you are here now with us. What evidence do you have 
either in the countries that have a standing data retention regime or in those 
in Europe that had one that was then annulled—Germany being one 
example—of improvements in the rate of clearance of crimes? Is there any 
evidence from any country at all that you could point to where data 
retention has led to an improvement in the rate of crime clearance? 
Ms Harmer: I think one of the challenges in that regard is the extent to 
which data as a single investigative resource can be said by itself to 
improve clearance rates. I expect you may have in mind a German report 
which suggests that there was a limited improvement or what has perhaps 
been characterised as negligible improvement in clearance rates as a result 
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of the introduction of data retention there. What the clearance rate reflects, 
of course, is the number of crimes solved as opposed to the number of 
crimes on hand. What access to data does is to provide the starting point for 
investigations and allow them to proceed further, or indeed to commence at 
all. In that regard, while there is that German report, I think it was only a 
fortnight ago that German Chancellor Merkel indicated her intention to 
lobby the EU for a new data retention directive, noting the very significant 
importance of data retention from her perspective to German investigations. 
CHAIR: You have still managed to avoid the question. Do you have any 
evidence from any jurisdiction at all that mandatory data retention either 
reduces crime or improves the rate at which crimes are solved? You may 
not have it at the table, but is there anything at all that you could point me 
to? 
Ms Harmer: The evidence in support of data retention is not cast in terms of 
clearance rates; it is cast in terms of— 
CHAIR: Or crime rate? I will take any metric you care to name. 
Ms Harmer: Perhaps in that regard I could refer you to some of the 
evidence of the law enforcement agencies who appeared last Friday. From 
an investigative perspective, it is the case that it is extremely difficult to 
point to data as one investigative tool having a direct and quantifiable 
impact on the number of prosecutions and convictions. The way in which 
law enforcement agencies apply metrics to assess their effectiveness and 
their prosecutions and convictions is not able to hinge back to a single data 
point. Accordingly— 
CHAIR: I am not talking about a single data point but the whole category of 
data retention or metadata access in general. It is the opposite of evidence 
based policy; it is anecdote based policy. 
Ms Jones: It is policy based on very strong advice from the agencies who 
have responsibilities in relation to law enforcement and national security. 
CHAIR: Of course they want more power. It is your job and ours to balance 
that power against proportionality and whether it is useful or not. I am just 
asking for evidence as to whether it is useful. All right—we will move 
on.
140
 
1.150 In fact, the committee heard that Germany has moved in the opposite 
direction to mandatory data retention, implementing a policy known as 
'datensparsamkeit' or 'data austerity' which places the onus on government agencies, 
departments and business to 'collect only that data which is necessary and 
proportionate'.
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140  Ms Katherine Jones, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Criminal Justice Group, 
Attorney-General's Department, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 February 2015, pp. 52–53; and 
Ms Anna Harmer , Acting First Assistant Secretary, National Security Law and Policy 
Division, Attorney-General's Department, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 February 2015,  
pp. 52–53. 
141  Ms Lindy Stephens, ThoughtWorks, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 2. 
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1.151 ThoughtWorks expressed the view that what is 'necessary and proportionate' 
is a difficult concept to define and 'does depend on the individual circumstances'.
142
 
ThoughtWorks cautioned however that as 'technology moves at a pace that is ahead of 
business and ahead of decisions and laws': 
…people are doing things because they are technologically possible, not 
because they are a good idea. So we are asking that businesses—and this is 
what we do ourselves—actually stop and think and make a decision: do 
they need that particular piece of data in order to serve their customers, in 
order to provide the services they provide, or is it just something they think 
they might need in the future? 
It is really more about stopping and asking whether you are collecting data 
just for the sake of it or whether you really need it to do business.
143
 
1.152 During its inquiry the committee also received evidence that in a 
30 June 2014 report of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human 
Rights titled 'The right to privacy in the digital age', the High Commissioner 'strongly 
emphasis[ed] the complicity of business in mass surveillance and in violating the right 
to privacy'.
144
 ThoughtWorks further explained the concerns of the UN High 
Commissioner: 
The former high commissioner outlined a few key points in her 
report…The first one is that she asserts that states have a positive obligation 
under international law to protect citizens from surveillance by private or 
state entities and that bulk collection and the very existence of mass 
surveillance, whether the information is used or not, interferes with the 
right to privacy. She also asserted that mandatory third-party retention is 
surveillance and that it is neither necessary nor proportionate and insists 
that a distinction between content and metadata is no longer persuasive. In 
other words, there is no longer any real distinction between metadata and 
content. The crucial finding applies the effective control doctrine under 
international law to internet infrastructure. So, states are obliged to extend 
human rights protections to whoever's privacy is interfered with by internet 
infrastructure on their territory.
145
 
1.153 The Chair also noted the similarly titled June 2014 Report of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, in 
which the ALRC advised: 
…privacy has been said to lie at the heart of liberty, and will often support 
other fundamental rights and freedoms, sometimes it must be balanced with 
other important interests… [however] privacy should not be casually 'traded 
off' for the sake of other important interests.
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Alternatives to mandatory data retention 
1.154 Submitters to the inquiry also suggested that mandatory data retention should 
not be pursued before alternatives are considered. 
1.155 The Australian Privacy Foundation explained that, in its view, mandatory data 
retention is not necessary as the existing preservation notice regime set out in the TIA 
Act 'should be sufficient to provide agencies with what they need'.
147
  
1.156 iiNet shared this view stating that '[t]argeted preservation notices used 
together with stored communications warrants provide an alternative framework to 
mass data retention that is designed to ensure that any retention and access to private 
data is necessary and legitimate'.
148
 The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) was of a 
similar view. In evidence to the committee, the IPA expressed that:  
It is also worth noting that it has not been adequately shown that 
preservation orders are not adequate to achieve the aims of the law 
enforcement. Stored preservation orders are targeted, proportional data 
retention schemes that offer a flexible and privacy-protecting mechanism to 
law enforcement agencies. It is striking to us how rarely the existence of 
this mechanism is discussed in the data retention debate when it would 
seem to resolve all the problems with the TIA act that have been identified 
by law enforcement agencies.
149
 
1.157 This view however was specifically discounted in the Minister's second 
reading speech when he explained that the '[e]xisting powers and laws are not 
adequate to respond to this challenge'.
150
 The department further explained the 
government's view that the often cited alternative of the existing preservation regime 
was insufficient: 
[T]he Department’s view, supported by international experience, is that 
expanding the existing preservation notice regime would not address the 
capability challenges faced by agencies. 
Preservation and data retention are complementary tools, but are aimed at 
different objectives. The purpose of preservation notices is to ‘quick freeze’ 
volatile or perishable electronic evidence that a provider possesses for a 
short period of time, to allow agencies time to apply for and obtain a 
warrant to access that information. Evidence cannot be preserved if it was 
never retained, or if it has already been deleted. For example, a preservation 
                                              
147  Mr Nigel Waters, Australian Privacy Foundation, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2014, p. 31. The 
preservation notice regime, set out in Part 3-1A of the TIA Act, establishes a system of 
preserving certain stored communications that are held by a carrier. The purpose of the 
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notice issued 9 months after a criminal event cannot assist an investigation 
if the data sought was destroyed after just 1 month’s existence. 
Preservation notices will not, therefore, address the fact that service 
providers are not retaining critical types of telecommunications data, or are 
retaining that data for shorter periods of time. In addition, as the current 
data authorisation provisions in Chapter 4 of the TIA Act already facilitate 
timely access to telecommunications data for legitimate investigative 
purposes, the Australian Government did not need to include preservation 
notices for telecommunications data in the Cybercrime Act. 
By comparison, the purpose of data retention is to introduce a consistent 
record-keeping requirement across industry to ensure that certain 
telecommunications data are consistently available. As such, data retention 
is in fact a prerequisite to preservation of data, rather than preservation 
offering an alternative to retention.
151
 
1.158 This section has looked briefly at the European experience with data retention. 
The final section sets out the Chair's view and recommendations in respect of the 
proposed mandatory data retention regime. 
  
                                              
151  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 27 (to the PJCIS inquiry), p. 17. 
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Chair's views and recommendations: mandatory data 
retention 
Introduction 
1.159 The Chair's views and recommendations set out below are made in respect of 
the policy of mandatory data retention in the context of the government's proposal set 
out in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 (Bill).  
1.160 The Chair notes that, at the time of tabling its report, the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) had finalised its inquiry into the Bill 
and the government had issued a response. The Chair is heartened by the 
government's announcement that it supports all 39 recommendations put forward by 
the PJCIS. However, although the Chair agrees with some of the recommendations of 
the PJCIS, he considers that others must go further and hopes that the government 
responds with similar speed and timeliness to this report and recommendations. 
Broader reform is required 
1.161 The Chair takes the view that the government's announcement that it will seek 
to implement mandatory data retention makes the need for the rationalisation and 
updating of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to 
be considered holistically more pressing. The Chair trusts that this inquiry will assist 
in moving towards a TIA Act which is more adapted both to contemporary technology 
and to the public's more evolved expectations in relation to privacy.  
1.162 The Chair is opposed to the introduction of a mandatory data retention regime 
and draws attention to the failed pursuit of such regimes internationally. It is 
particularly concerning that the government is considering requiring the retention of 
data even if it serves no business purpose and would therefore only be retained as a 
result of this new regime. The Chair references the international experience and 
suggests that the German approach of retaining only that which is both necessary and 
proportionate, 'datensparsemkeit', should guide policy and law makers.  
1.163 The Chair is critical of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 currently before Parliament. The regime being 
proposed equates to mass surveillance. It should not proceed. The grounds for 
implementing a policy of mandatory data retention have not been established to the 
Chair's satisfaction.  
1.164 The implications for the right to privacy and freedom of the press must not be 
traded away without careful consideration or in the absence of adequate legislative 
safeguards.  
1.165 Throughout its inquiry, the committee received evidence clearly illustrating 
that what was collected as telecommunications data in 1979 was a small fraction of 
what is collected as telecommunications data in 2015. The evidence illustrated the 
difficulties of defining 'telecommunications data' yet clearly showed that 
telecommunications data today provides a much fuller picture of a person's social 
connections, values, personal preferences and habits. It is clear to the Chair that the 
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analogy of the envelope and the letter no longer describes the distinction between 
content and metadata in the digital age.  
Recommendation 4 
1.166 The Chair recommends that the government not proceed with a 
mandatory data retention regime and that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be withdrawn. 
The need for a definition 
1.167 The Chair considers that a definition of 'telecommunications data' or 
'metadata' must be settled and incorporated into a redrafted Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). A definition should be developed by 
industry, together with government and privacy advocates. Until a definition is settled, 
the scope, cost and privacy implications of any proposed data retention regime remain 
unquantifiable. 
1.168 The Chair does not support the proposed definition of 'telecommunications 
data' set out in the Bill currently before the parliament. The Chair agrees with 
Recommendation 2 of the PJCIS that the Bill should be amended to include the 
proposed data set in primary legislation.
152
 However, the Chair suggests that revisions 
to the definition of the data set go further and identify those elements within the data 
set that constitute the 'information that allows a communication to occur'
153
and 'basic 
subscriber data'
154
 and identify that any change to the parameters of the data set must 
occur through the legislative process.  
1.169 The Chair considers that the evidence received by the PJCIS that industry will 
find it 'very challenging' to separate the content from the metadata for some types of 
data further supports its view that different elements of the data set have greater 
privacy implications than others and adds weight to calls for the introduction of a 
warranted access regime for data that is 'information that allows a communication to 
occur'.
155
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February 2015, p. 79. 
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Access to telecommunications data 
1.170 The Chair acknowledges that 'basic subscriber data'156 should be able to be 
accessed without a warrant but maintains that access to data that is 'information that 
allows a communication to occur'
157
 should occur via warrant.  
1.171 The Chair notes that evidence received by the PJCIS during its inquiry into 
the proposed mandatory data retention regime was overwhelmingly supportive of the 
introduction of warranted access to metadata yet the PJCIS dismissed that evidence on 
the basis that it would 'impede the operational effectiveness of agencies…to the 
detriment of the protection of the Australian community'.
158
 The Chair disagrees with 
this assessment and suggests that differentiating between 'basic subscriber data' and 
data that is 'information that allows a communication to occur' and requiring the latter 
category of data to be accessed only via warrant, would in fact better balance the 
important public interests of privacy and security. 
1.172 The Chair notes the government's proposal to amend the definition of 
'enforcement agency' for the purposes of accessing telecommunications data and 
supports the principle of restricting access to telecommunications data through 
tightening the definition of 'enforcement agency' for the purposes of Chapter 4 of the 
TIA Act. However, the Chair is opposed to proposed new subsections 176A(3) and 
176A(4) which would provide the Attorney-General with a discretion to declare an 
authority or agency to be an 'enforcement agency' for the purposes of accessing 
telecommunications data. Furthermore, the Chair considers that access to metadata 
should also be limited through a revision of the associated proportionality test. The 
Chair acknowledges Recommendation 25 of the PJCIS report
159
 but maintains that it 
does not go far enough.
160
 In the absence of a concurrent revision of the 
                                              
156  For example, data identifying information such as the name, address and contact details of a 
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157  For example, data including the internet identifier, service identifier, and geo-location data. 
158  PJCIS, Advisory report on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014, February 2015, p. 245. 
159  Recommendation 25 of the PJCIS report stated: 
The Committee recommends that section 180F of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
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grounds that any interference with the privacy of any person or persons that may result from the 
disclosure or use is justifiable and proportionate. In making this decision the authorised officer 
should be required to have regard to: 
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160  PJCIS, Advisory report on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014, February 2015, p. 251. 
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proportionality test to restrict access to metadata to situations where it is 'necessary' 
for the investigation of specified serious crimes or categories of serious crimes, reform 
will be neutered. 
1.173 The Chair also notes that throughout this inquiry the government has stated 
that calls for a revision of this proportionality test would be inconsistent with 
Australia's obligations under the European Union Convention on Cybercrime. The 
Chair does not agree with this position and is frustrated by the government's 
willingness to preference a minor Council of Europe convention over Australia's 
obligations under international human rights law and the fundamental right to privacy 
of its citizens. 
The proposed retention period 
1.174 The Chair is concerned by the data retention period proposed in the Bill of 
two years. The Chair disagrees with Recommendation 9 of the PJCIS report which 
recommends that the two-year retention period specified in the Bill be maintained and 
its finding that two years is 'the minimum amount of time that would be acceptable 
from a national security and law enforcement perspective'.
161
 The Chair believes that 
the proposed retention period of two years is out of step with international 
jurisdictions, many of which are moving in the opposite direction. The Chair notes the 
evidence that both this committee and the PJCIS received, which identified that in the 
majority of cases where metadata is used for law enforcement purposes, it is less than 
12 months old.  
A destruction requirement 
1.175 The Chair is very concerned by the absence in the Bill of a destruction 
requirement when data is no longer required. In the Chair's view the absence of a 
destruction requirement directly contradicts the Australian Privacy Principles (APP's), 
particularly APP 11. The Chair notes Recommendation 28 of the PJCIS that the 
'Attorney-General's Department oversee a review of the adequacy of the existing 
destruction requirements that apply to documents or information disclosed pursuant to 
an authorisation made under Chapter 4 of the [TIA Act] and held by enforcement 
agencies and ASIO'.
162
 The Chair believes that this recommendation does not go far 
enough and the Bill should be amended to include an express requirement to destroy 
data after the data retention period has expired or the information is no longer needed. 
The Chair does, however, support Recommendation 35 of the PJCIS which calls for 
the APP's to apply to all service providers regardless of their turnover.
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Oversight  
1.176 The Chair supports the proposed new oversight and inspection regime set out 
in Schedule 3 of the Bill. The Chair considers however, that Schedule 3 of the Bill 
should be further strengthened by the inclusion of a requirement that enforcement 
agencies also retain records in relation to: 
 the type and age of metadata requested;  
 the offences to which a request relates; and  
 any outcomes following the request.  
1.177 This data should be included in the annual report of the Attorney-General's 
department.  
1.178 The Chair notes that the requirement for the Commonwealth Ombudsman to 
inspect records in proposed Chapter 4A, does not identify a timeframe for inspection. 
The Chair considers that this should be addressed through the inclusion of a provision 
requiring the Commonwealth Ombudsman to examine the records of each agency 
which has access to metadata every six months. 
1.179 The Chair acknowledges that the introduction of a comprehensive inspection 
and oversight regime will have significant resourcing implications for the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and therefore echoes Recommendation 29 of the PJCIS 
which calls for additional financial resources for the Commonwealth Ombudsman to 
ensure it can carry out a broader role of overseeing access to telecommunications data. 
However, the Chair suggests that the resources sought by the PJCIS in 
Recommendation 32 would be better allocated to assist the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security with the 
independent statutory oversight functions of those offices. 
Protection of press freedom 
1.180 In its report on the Bill, the PJCIS recommended that further inquiry is needed 
before recognition of 'the principle of press freedom and the protection of journalists' 
sources' in the Bill is finalised.
164
 Although the Chair supports this recommendation, 
he is of the view that this inquiry extend to other professions, for example, medical 
professionals and lawyers, where the integrity of the profession depends upon privacy 
and confidentiality. The Chair suggests that this issue be resolved and protections for 
these classes of professions be included in the Bill before it is considered by the 
Parliament. 
Mandatory data breach notification scheme 
1.181 The Chair expresses his support for the PJCIS's recommendation 
(Recommendation 38) to implement a mandatory data breach notification scheme by 
the end of 2015 and agrees with the PJCIS that 'there must be a [mandatory data 
breach notification] scheme in place prior to the implementation of the Bill' as it 
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'would provide a strong incentive for service providers to implement robust security 
measures to protect data retained under the data retention regime'.
165
 
Recommendation 5 
1.182 If the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 is not withdrawn the Chair recommends that the Bill be 
amended to:  
 include a definition of 'telecommunications data' in the primary 
legislation; 
 identify in the definition of 'telecommunications data' the elements of the 
data set as either 'information that allows a communication to occur' or 
'basic subscriber information'; 
 delete proposed subsections 176A(3) and 176A(4) which provide the 
Minister with the ability to declare an authority or agency to be an 
enforcement agency for the purposes of accessing metadata;  
 amend the proportionality test set out in existing sections 177, 178 and 
179 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The 
Australian Privacy Commissioner, Law Council of Australia and the 
Australian Human Rights Commission are to be consulted in amending 
the proportionality test associated with accessing telecommunications 
data; 
 include a requirement for data that is 'information that allows a 
communication to occur' to be accessed only via warrant; 
 reduce the mandatory data retention period from two years to 
three months; 
 include a requirement that all data be stored in Australia;  
 include a requirement to destroy telecommunications data after the 
mandatory retention period or when it is no longer needed; 
 include protections for sensitive classes of professionals including 
journalists and their sources, medical professionals, and lawyers;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
165  PJCIS, Advisory report on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014, February 2015, pp. 298–299. 
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 amend proposed section 186A to include a requirement that the following 
information also be kept by an agency:  
 the type of metadata requested; 
 the age of the metadata requested; 
 the offence(s) which the request related to;  
 the outcome following the request; 
and include a requirement in proposed section 187P that this information 
be reported in the Attorney-General's annual report to the Parliament; 
 amend proposed section 186B to include a requirement that the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman examine the records of each agency which 
has access to metadata every six months;  
 amend proposed section 187N (Review of operation of Part) to require 
both the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and 
the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to review the data 
retention regime on a triennial basis; and  
 introduce a mandatory data breach notification regime. 
Recommendation 6 
1.183 The Chair recommends that the government introduce a statutory right 
to privacy, similar to that which exists in the United Kingdom, rather than 
relying on international human rights instruments. 
Divergent views on '5 Eyes' collaboration 
1.184 The Chair notes that there is significant variance between the evidence 
presented by Australian law enforcement agencies and oversight bodies, and the 
revelations about international surveillance and information sharing provided by 
whistleblowers and some elements of the media. 
1.185 WikiLeaks publisher Mr Julian Assange, who has been instrumental in 
publishing a large volume of information from within many governments, told the 
committee in WikiLeaks' submission
166
 that the nature of information-sharing among 
the so-called "5 Eyes" countries (the United States, Canada, the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand) had been 'fundamentally misrepresented'.  Mr Assange said: 
When asked about the information sharing practices of the 5 Eyes, the 
Committee heard on 23 April 2014 from Assistant Inspector General Blight 
from the Office of the IGIS that "... data sharing about Australian persons 
for ASD is regulated tightly by the Intelligence Services Act and the 
privacy rules made under that act and that data about Australian persons is 
subject to quite strict oversight . 
In fact, the revelations of Edward Snowden have documented shared and 
integrated 5 Eyes databases, and that untargeted, bulk interception, 
                                              
166  WikiLeaks, Submission 46. 
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collection and sharing of algorithmic analysis of private communications 
are routine among the 5 Eyes intelligence agencies. 
It is absurd that Australian government agencies continue to misrepresent 
the nature of interception and their access to intercepted data via 5 Eyes 
sharing arrangements when their equivalents in the UK have acknowledged 
their role in mass surveillance, including through convenient interpretations 
of domestic laws to absorb "external communications" which includes all 
communications transiting Internet platforms and services such as Google, 
Skype, Facebook, Yahoo not based in the UK. 
1.186 Mr Assange particularly drew the committee's attention to documents 
submitted to the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal by Mr Charles Blandford Farr, the 
Director-General of the UK Government’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. 
Mr Blandford Farr's attendance at the Tribunal attracted attention in June 2014 
particularly for his comments that UK intelligence services could legally intercept 
communications through social media and webmail services operated by companies 
such as Google and Facebook. 
1.187 Mr Assange also drew the committee's attention to the US NSA 
XKEYSCORE surveillance program, the UK Tempora program. He wrote: 
This [XKEYSCORE] program includes a Five Eyes Defeat checkbox that 
allows analysts to filter out data from one or more of the Five Eyes 
countries. Such a check box makes sense only in the context of a default 
sharing of information among the 5 Eyes that inevitably and necessarily 
circumvents the [Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act]. 
[IGIS] Dr. Thom confirmed that the "quite strict oversight" also applied to 
Australian citizens abroad. The Tempora program also revealed by 
Snowden refutes this simplistic assumption. Under that program, all 5 Eyes 
nations access data and metadata resulting from British tapping of fibre 
optic cable; there are no protections provided to Australians under such 
indiscriminate collection and sharing arrangements. 
Amendments made to the Intelligence Services Act in 2011, including the 
"WikiLeaks Amendment" so dubbed by employees of the Attorney 
General's Department, greatly reduced the scope or meaning of protections 
for Australians overseas and greatly increased the surveillance of their 
communications permitted. 
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By expanding the scope of surveillance overreach to anyone that was "in 
the interest of Australia's national security, Australia's foreign relations or 
Australia's economic wellbeing," almost anyone could be caught, rendering 
the 'strict oversight' a gesture, a meaningless gesture in the context of mass 
surveillance, collection and sharing of intelligence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator Scott Ludlam 
Inquiry Chair 
 
  
 
Additional Remarks from Government Senators 
1.1 The government members of the committee acknowledge universal support 
for reform of the legislative scheme governing telecommunications interception and 
access. 
1.2 Government members agree with the findings of the recent inquiry conducted 
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) into the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 
2014 ('Data Retention Bill'), and support the PJCIS inquiry's recommendation that the 
Data Retention Bill be passed.
1
  
1.3 Government Senators acknowledge the tension that persists between the 
interests of individual privacy, and national security and note that this tension has 
been exacerbated by irresponsible public commentary and reporting around the issue 
of reform of the scheme governing telecommunications interception and access.  
1.4 Government members of the committee prefer to view these so-called 
'competing' interests—personal/professional privacy, and national security—as 
inherently complementary interests, and urge a consensus approach to reform. 
1.5 The government members of the committee reject the Chair's Report on data 
access and data retention as an over-simplification of the complex relationship 
between the complementary interests of national security and individual privacy. The 
Chair's report examines data retention from a highly biased perspective, and 
irresponsibly recommends additional layers of tax-payer-funded oversight that 
duplicate existing protective frameworks and are of limited or no utility.  
The Reform Agenda 
1.6 The current scheme governing telecommunications interception and access 
pre-dates mobile telephony and both mobile and fixed data services. It is no longer 
practicable to rely upon successive amendments to the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) to accommodate the pace and breadth 
of technological change. 
1.7 The committee's inquiry revealed a wide range of views regarding the 
preferable characteristics for reform of the TIA Act. These views overwhelmingly 
focused on protecting national security, protecting individual rights to privacy, and 
enhancing administrative efficiencies.  
                                              
1  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Advisory Report on the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, February 
2015, p.xxv. 
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1.8 Any programme of reform must balance individual interests and national 
interests with sensitivity, maturity and common sense. The need for balance was 
clearly expressed by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) following its 
2006-8 review of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth): 
As a recognised human right, privacy protection generally should take 
precedence over a range of other countervailing interests, such as cost and 
convenience. It is often the case, however, that privacy rights will clash 
with a range of other individual rights and collective interests, such as 
freedom of expression and national security. International instruments on 
human rights and growing international and domestic jurisprudence in this 
field all recognise that privacy protection is not an absolute.
2
  
Streamlining the Warrant Regime 
1.9 Compelling evidence was received during the inquiry regarding the 
complexity of the existing scheme governing warranted access to telecommunications 
content and metadata. The administrative burden created by intricate process 
requirements was described inter alia by the Director-General of Security: 
Over time, the many amendments to the TIA Act have resulted in 
duplication and complexity making the Act difficult to understand and 
apply.
3
  
1.10 Government members of the committee support recommendations from law-
enforcement and national security agencies calling for the introduction of a single 
attribute-based warrant scheme for content retrievals and interceptions.
4
 Government 
Senators are persuaded that the targeted nature of attribute-based warrants will lend 
efficiency and expedience to investigative practices, as well as protecting individual 
rights to privacy through the observance of proportionality thresholds. 
1.11 In supporting the introduction of a single attribute-based warrant scheme 
ASIO and the ACC noted the need to maintain 'proportionality thresholds and 
accountability requirements…to deliver public confidence and assurance regarding the 
use of these powers'.
5
 The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) explained:  
…where a State seeks to restrict human rights, such as the right to privacy, 
for legitimate and defined purposes, for example in the context of 
telecommunications access and interception, the principles of necessity and 
proportionality must be applied. The measures taken must be appropriate 
and the least intrusive to achieve the objective. In the context of 
                                              
2  For Your Information – Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) Report #108, p. 104. 
3  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 34. 
4  For example ASIO, Submission 27, p. 26; Attorney-General's Department (AGD), Submission 
26, pp. 16-19. 
5  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 35. See also: ACC, Submission 23, p. 14. 
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telecommunications access and interception, this involves balancing the 
intrusiveness of the interference, against operational needs.
6
 
1.12 The government members are satisfied that proportionality thresholds are 
satisfactorily maintained by relevant agencies, through existing procedural and 
oversight functions, to a standard that may reasonably be anticipated by the 
community-at-large. 
1.13 The government members of the committee are strongly of the view that the 
utility of a single attribute-based warrant scheme should not be compromised through 
the imposition of cumbersome and unnecessary limitations or exceptions.  
1.14 The protections that are currently conferred upon citizens' in relation to 
metadata will be substantially improved by the passage of the government's 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) 
Bill 2014. 
1.15 Government members of the committee acknowledge the privacy implications 
of changes to warranted access however they are reassured by the government's 
unambiguous commitment to the preservation of individual privacy within the 
imperatives of the contemporary risk environment. 
Oversight and the Commonwealth Public Interest Monitor 
1.16 There is a range of existing oversight mechanisms for access to data and 
content, including in certain circumstances warrant regimes. These oversight functions 
protect the public interest in the preservation of individual privacy, as well as the 
public interest in the protection of national security. 
1.17 The government members of the committee are satisfied that existing 
oversight functions are sufficient and that the introduction of a Commonwealth Public 
Interest Monitor would unnecessarily duplicate existing processes at the tax-payers' 
expense. Government members of the committee do not consider that this would 
reflect the public interest.  
Metadata – Definition 
1.18 The need for reform to the TIA Act is substantially due to the existing 
scheme's inability to accommodate the pace and breadth of technological change. The 
government members of the committee are mindful that inclusion of a prescriptive 
definition of 'metadata' in the legislative scheme could limit investigative scope in 
future, thus requiring amendments of the type and frequency that have led to the 
complexity found in the existing scheme. 
                                              
6  Law Council of Australia, Submission 34, p. 5. 
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1.19 Government members encourage further consultation regarding the 
technology-neutral definition of all terms across any proposed reform of the TIA Act. 
Mandatory Data Retention 
1.20 Government Senators fully support the mandatory data retention scheme that 
is contemplated by the Data Retention Bill that is presently before the Parliament as 
fundamental to Australia's national security and law enforcement priorities.  
1.21 National security and law enforcement agencies have unanimously and 
unambiguously identified the value derived from telecommunications data in the 
conduct of investigative activities.
7
  
1.22 The Attorney-General's Department has stated that the increasing need for 
data retention has resulted from technological developments and consequential 
changes in the business practices of service providers: 
Historically, service providers have generated and retained 
telecommunications data for their business purposes. However, as providers 
shift to modern, IP-based networks and services, they are tending to retain a 
narrower range of data, and to retain that data for shorter periods.
8
  
1.23 The government members of the committee acknowledge evidence that 
mandatory data retention has the potential to provide greater privacy to individuals 
who may otherwise fall under the gaze of law enforcement investigations where such 
investigations would be required to cast a wider net in the absence of retained data. 
For example, the ACC submitted that accessing retained data enabled it to conduct 
investigations without needing to intercept or access the content of a wider range of 
communications.
9
 
1.24 The ACC noted however that the retention of telecommunications content and 
data by service providers in Australia is variable and subject to the storage capacity of 
the service provider in question. The resultant lack of a consistent national standard: 
…results in uncertainty for law enforcement and can jeopardise the 
outcome of operations. These differences in retention periods create 
difficulties for the ACC in its ability to undertake investigations into 
federally relevant criminal activity, as valuable telecommunications data is 
not always available when needed. When it comes to conducting ACC 
investigations on long-term federally relevant criminal activity, access to 
retrospective telecommunications data is critical for the ACC to understand 
the scope and nature of the threat.
10
  
                                              
7  AGD, Submission 26, pp. 3, 4; ASIO, Submission 27, pp. 5, 33, 39. 
8  AGD, Submission 26, p. 30. 
9  ACC, Submission 23, p. 15. 
10  ACC, Submission 23, p. 15. 
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1.25 ASIO explained that it considered that a data retention period of 'at least two 
years in some cases' is required for it to effectively discharge its functions.
11
  
1.26 The Australian Federal Police also supported calls for a mandatory data 
retention regime, explaining that this would ensure a 'national and systematic 
approach is taken to safeguarding the ongoing availability of telecommunications data 
for legitimate purposes'.
12
  
Objects Clause 
1.27 Government Senators are of the view that the privacy interests of individual 
citizens are comprehensively protected by a range of existing legislated and regulated 
oversight functions.  
1.28 The protection of individual personal privacy is also implicit in the operation 
of the TIA Act itself which was enacted to provide a scheme of regulation for the 
interception of and access to the communications of private individuals. Government 
Senators are mindful that a prescriptive statement of objectives could have the same 
limiting effect on this scheme as a prescriptive definition of 'metadata'.  
1.29 The inclusion of an objects clause in the TIA Act as an additional clarification 
of privacy protections would be of limited utility.  
Destruction requirement 
1.30 Government members of the committee are of the view that service providers 
are likely to be sufficiently motivated by commercial considerations to purge stored 
data once any statutory retention period has elapsed and do not believe prescriptive 
destruction parameters would impact the frequency, immediacy or completeness of 
the destruction of stored data.   
1.31 In addition, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) provides a framework for the 
destruction of personal information where the information is no longer required under 
law or for a legitimate business purpose.
13
  
Conclusions and Recommendations  
1.32 The government members of the committee acknowledge the sensitivity and 
complexity of debate around the complementary interests of national security and 
individual rights to privacy. Technological developments such as the proliferation of 
data mobility have contributed to the intricacies of this debate. 
                                              
11  ASIO, Submission 27, p. 27. 
12  Australian Federal Police, Submission 25, p. 10. 
13  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), ss 4 and 11. 
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1.33 Any scheme of reform of the TIA Act must measure the individual interest 
against the national interest as well as accommodating the interests of commercial 
operators. The government members of the committee support a considered approach 
that will focus on consultation in exploring all facets of reform of the TIA Act. 
1.34 Government Senators agree with the findings of the PJCIS inquiry into the 
Data Retention Bill and acknowledge that the government has announced its support 
for all 39 of the PJCIS report's recommendations. Government members of the 
committee wholeheartedly support the passage of the Data Retention Bill, and the 
implementation of a mandatory data retention scheme, as a matter of national urgency. 
Recommendation 1 
1.35 The government members of the committee recommend the instigation of 
a single attribute-based warrant scheme to apply to telecommunications content. 
Recommendation 2 
1.36 The government members of the committee recommend that the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) 
Bill 2014 be passed by the Senate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Senator the Hon Ian Macdonald 
Deputy Chair 
  
 
Comments from Opposition Senators 
The Opposition notes the earlier inquiries into the telecommunications interception 
regime in Australia, referred to in Chapter 1 of this report.  In particular, the 
Opposition notes that following a year of extensive consultation and detailed 
consideration, in June 2013 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security (PJCIS) tabled a unanimous report recommending wide-ranging reforms to 
Australia's national security legislation.  In particular, the PJCIS conducted a 
comprehensive review of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
(TIA Act), and in Chapter 2 of its 2013 Report made 18 recommendations for 
improvements to that legislative framework. 
Labor members of this Committee endorse Recommendation 18 of the 2013 PJCIS 
Report, which states: 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the 
objective of designing an interception regime which is underpinned by the 
following: 
• clear protection for the privacy of communications; 
• provisions which are technology neutral; 
• maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by provisions for 
appropriate use of intercepted information for lawful purposes; 
• clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and 
• robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative 
efficiency. 
The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be 
undertaken in consultation with interested stakeholders, including privacy 
advocates and practitioners, oversight bodies, telecommunications 
providers, law enforcement and security agencies. 
The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be released 
as an exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the Government 
should expressly seek the views of key agencies, including the: 
• Independent National Security Legislation Monitor; 
• Australian Information Commissioner; 
• ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the 
draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
Although the 2013 Report of the PJCIS was unanimous, and included the current 
Attorney-General as one of its members at the time, the Abbott Government has still 
not responded to the recommendations in Chapter 2, let alone commenced the 
considerable work outlined in Recommendation 18 above.  Labor is also concerned 
that the Abbott Government chose to ignore the recommendations for a 
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comprehensive review of the TIA Act while pressing ahead with the introduction of a 
new data retention regime in the form of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (Data Retention Bill).  It is clear to 
Labor members of this Committee that improving the legislative framework for 
telecommunications interception and access should have been undertaken prior to the 
introduction of a mandatory data retention regime, which necessarily relies on the 
existing, and now outdated, TIA Act framework. 
Labor Members of this Committee also note that in its February 2015 Advisory report 
on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) 
Bill 2014, the PJCIS recommended that 'the Government provide a response to the 
outstanding recommendations from the Committee's 2013 Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia's National Security Legislation by 1 July 2015'.  Labor 
members of this Committee endorse this recommendation of the PJCIS, noting that 
eighteen of the nineteen outstanding recommendations referred to relate to reform of 
the TIA Act.  We have reproduced below the 18 recommendations of the PJCIS from 
the June 2013 Report relating to the TIA Act, and call on the Government to formally 
accept all of these recommendations and to commence as soon as practicable the 
revision of that Act. 
Labor members of this Committee also take this opportunity to express our 
disappointment at the chaotic and unnecessarily rushed manner in which the Abbott 
Government approached the Data Retention Bill.  The Abbott Government did 
nothing to progress data retention laws during its first year in office, preferring to 
instead focus its energies on campaigns such as its failed attempt to repeal the race 
hate provisions in section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975.  Despite failing 
to act on data retention laws for over a year in office, when it finally decided to act on 
data retention the Abbott Government claimed that the matter was suddenly of great 
urgency.  The Government then chose to ignore the unanimous 2013 recommendation 
of the PJCIS to release an exposure draft of the proposed legislation for consultation, 
and instead introduced a significantly flawed bill into the Parliament.  Now infamous 
attempts by senior members of the Government to explain the Bill in the weeks after 
its introduction only created confusion that exacerbated public concern about the 
effects of the proposed legislation. 
The Government then sought to rush the review of the Data Retention Bill by the 
PJCIS, pressing for the Bill to be reviewed with an urgency that would have precluded 
proper public scrutiny.  However, Labor insisted that the Government allow time for 
proper consideration of the Bill by the PJCIS, including adequate time for the public, 
legal bodies and key stakeholders to make submissions, and for public hearings to be 
held. 
The review of the Data Retention Bill by the PJCIS revealed how flawed the 
Government's proposed legislation was. In its 2015 report the PJCIS made 
38 substantive recommendations for changes to the Bill to improve the efficacy of the 
proposed regime, while at the same time introducing significant improvements to the 
data security, oversight and accountability mechanisms under which the proposed 
 89 
 
regime would operate.  Those recommendations were all accepted by the Government, 
and required numerous amendments to the Bill. 
Labor members of this Committee strongly suggest that the Government take a more 
sensible, measured and consultative approach to reform of the TIA Act. Specifically, 
Labor recommends that the Government does not again ignore the bipartisan 
recommendations of the PJCIS, and follows the recommendation to revise the TIA 
Act in consultation with relevant stakeholders and to release an exposure draft of a 
revised TIA Act for public consultation and for consideration by the PJCIS. 
Recommendations of the 2013 PJCIS Report with respect to 
telecommunications interception 
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends the inclusion of an objectives clause within the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which: 
 expresses the dual objectives of the legislation 
 to protect the privacy of communications; 
 to enable interception and access to communications in order to investigate 
serious crime and threats to national security; and 
 accords with the privacy principles contained in the Privacy Act 1988. 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends the Attorney-General's Department undertake an 
examination of the proportionality tests within the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).  Factors to be considered in the proportionality tests 
include the: 
 privacy impacts of proposed investigative activity; 
 public interest served by the proposed investigative activity, including the 
gravity of the conduct being investigated; and 
 availability and effectiveness of less privacy intrusive investigative 
techniques. 
The Committee further recommends that the examination of the proportionality tests 
also consider the appropriateness of applying a consistent proportionality test across 
the interception, stored communications and access to telecommunications data 
powers in the TIA Act. 
Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department examine the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 with a view to revising the 
reporting requirements to ensure that the information provided assists in the 
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evaluation of whether the privacy intrusion was proportionate to the public outcome 
sought. 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department undertake a 
review of the oversight arrangements to consider the appropriate organisation or 
agency to ensure effective accountability under the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979. 
Further, the review should consider the scope of the role to be undertaken by the 
relevant oversight mechanism. 
The Committee also recommends the Attorney-General's Department consult with 
State and Territory ministers prior to progressing any proposed reforms to ensure 
jurisdictional considerations are addressed. 
Recommendation 5 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department review the 
threshold for access to telecommunications data.  This review should focus on 
reducing the number of agencies able to access telecommunications data by using 
gravity of conduct which may be investigated utilising telecommunications data as the 
threshold on which access is allowed. 
Recommendation 6 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department examine the 
standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of communications. The 
standardisation should consider the: 
 privacy impact of the threshold; 
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy intrusion; 
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative means; 
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular threshold; and 
 impact on law enforcement agencies' investigative capabilities, including 
those accessing stored communications when investigating pecuniary penalty 
offences. 
Recommendation 7 
The Committee recommends that interception be conducted on the basis of specific 
attributes of communications. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government model 'attribute based 
interception' on the existing named person interception warrants, which includes: 
 91 
 
 the ability for the issuing authority to set parameters around the variation of 
attributes for interception; 
 the ability for interception agencies to vary the attributes for interception; and 
 reporting on the attributes added for interception by an authorised officer 
within an interception agency. 
In addition to Parliamentary oversight, the Committee recommends that attribute 
based interception be subject to the following safeguards and accountability measures: 
 attribute based interception is only authorised when an issuing authority or 
approved officer is satisfied the facts and grounds indicate that interception is 
proportionate to the offence or national security threat being investigated; 
 oversight of attribute based interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their respective 
Ministers on the effectiveness of attribute based interception. 
Recommendation 8 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department review the 
information sharing provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 to ensure: 
 protection of the security and privacy of intercepted information; and 
 sharing of information where necessary to facilitate investigation of serious 
crime or threats to national security. 
Recommendation 9 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 be amended to remove legislative duplication. 
Recommendation 10 
The Committee recommends that the telecommunications interception warrant 
provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be revised 
to develop a single interception warrant regime. 
The Committee recommends the single warrant regime include the following features: 
 a single threshold for law enforcement agencies to access communications 
based on serious criminal offences; 
 removal of the concept of stored communications to provide uniform 
protection to the content of communications; and 
 maintenance of the existing ability to apply for telephone applications for 
warrants, emergency warrants and ability to enter premises. 
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The Committee further recommends that the single warrant regime be subject to the 
following safeguards and accountability measures: 
 interception is only authorised when an issuing authority is satisfied the facts 
and grounds indicate that interception is proportionate to the offence or 
national security threat being investigated; 
 rigorous oversight of interception by the ombudsmen and Inspector-General 
of Intelligence and Security; 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their respective 
Ministers on the effectiveness of interception; and 
 Parliamentary oversight of the use of interception. 
Recommendation 11 
The Committee recommends that the Government review the application of the 
interception-related industry assistance obligations contained in the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and Telecommunications Act 
1997. 
Recommendation 12 
The Committee recommends the Government consider expanding the regulatory 
enforcement options available to the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
to include a range of enforcement mechanisms in order to provide tools proportionate 
to the conduct being regulated. 
Recommendation 13 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 be amended to include provisions which clearly express the scope of the 
obligations which require telecommunications providers to provide assistance to law 
enforcement and national security agencies regarding telecommunications interception 
and access to telecommunications data. 
Recommendation 14 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access 
Act) 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to make it clear beyond 
doubt that the existing obligations of the telecommunications interception regime 
apply to all providers (including ancillary service providers) of telecommunications 
services accessed within Australia. As with the existing cost sharing arrangements, 
this should be done on a no-profit and no-loss basis for ancillary service providers. 
Recommendation 15 
The Committee recommends that the Government should develop the implementation 
model on the basis of a uniformity of obligations while acknowledging that the 
creation of exemptions on the basis of practicability and affordability may be 
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justifiable in particular cases.  However, in all such cases the burden should lie on the 
industry participants to demonstrate why they should receive these exemptions. 
Recommendation 16 
The Committee recommends that, should the Government decide to develop an 
offence for failure to assist in decrypting communications, the offence be developed in 
consultation with the telecommunications industry, the Department of Broadband 
Communications and the Digital Economy, and the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority.  It is important that any such offence be expressed with sufficient 
specificity so that telecommunications providers are left with a clear understanding of 
their obligations. 
Recommendation 17 
The Committee recommends that, if the Government decides to develop timelines for 
telecommunications industry assistance for law enforcement and national security 
agencies, the timelines should be developed in consultation with the investigative 
agencies, the telecommunications industry, the Department of Broadband 
Communications and the Digital Economy, and the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority. 
The Committee further recommends that, if the Government decides to develop 
mandatory timelines, the cost to the telecommunications industry must be considered. 
Recommendation 18 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the objective of designing an 
interception regime which is underpinned by the following: 
 clear protection for the privacy of communications; 
 provisions which are technology neutral; 
 maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by provisions for 
appropriate use of intercepted information for lawful purposes; 
 clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and 
 robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative efficiency. 
The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be undertaken in 
consultation with interested stakeholders, including privacy advocates and 
practitioners, oversight bodies, telecommunications providers, law enforcement and 
security agencies. 
The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be released as an 
exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the Government should expressly 
seek the views of key agencies, including the: 
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor; 
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 Australian Information Commissioner; 
 ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the draft 
legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
Conclusion 
Labor will always work to keep our nation safe, and at the same time to uphold the 
rights and freedoms enjoyed by all Australians.  Getting this balance right can be a 
challenging task, and it is clear that there is still work to do to ensure that Australia's 
national security and law enforcement legislation meets the needs of our agencies 
while at the same time incorporating robust and effective oversight mechanisms and 
safeguards. 
For example, Labor will continue to press for improvements to data security through 
the Telecommunications Sector Security Reform (TSSR) process.  The TSSR aims to 
identify, manage and mitigate national security risks associated with Australia's 
telecommunications infrastructure, including matters such as the physical location of 
stored telecommunications data.  This was also the subject of the PJCIS's 2013 report, 
which included at Recommendation 19: 
The Committee recommends that the Government amend the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 to create a telecommunications security 
framework that will provide: 
• a telecommunications industry-wide obligation to protect 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across it from 
unauthorised interference; 
• a requirement for industry to provide the Government with 
information to assist in the assessment of national security risks to 
telecommunications infrastructure; and 
• powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage compliance. 
These PJCIS also recommended that the TSSR be subject to a comprehensive 
regulatory impact assessment. 
In addition to the TSSR process, Senator John Faulkner, who retired from the 
Parliament in February this year, advocated for further improvements to the 
transparency and accountability mechanisms in our national security frameworks.  It 
was Senator Faulkner's view that it is the Parliament to which our police and national 
security agencies are ultimately accountable, and it is the Parliament's responsibility to 
oversee their priorities and effectiveness, and to ensure that our agencies meet the 
requirements and standards that Parliament sets. 
To this end Senator Faulkner developed a set of reforms designed to ensure that the 
effectiveness of Parliamentary oversight of intelligence and security agencies keeps 
pace with any enhanced powers being given to those agencies.  A key reform 
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recommended by Senator Faulkner was for the PJCIS to have oversight of certain 
operational matters of the security agencies.  Progress towards that reform is evident 
in the Data Retention Bill, which Labor pressed to be amended so that the PJCIS 
could oversight aspects of the data retention scheme. 
Labor will bring forward legislation this year to give effect to the wider reforms 
proposed by Senator Faulkner. 
Labor believes that ensuring the ongoing efficacy and integrity of our national security 
architecture is an ongoing responsibility of all parliamentarians, and Labor will 
continue to engage constructively in this important process. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Jacinta Collins 
Labor Senator for Victoria 
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Appendix 1 
Recommendations 1 to 18, 42 and 43 of the PJCIS Report 
of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia's 
National Security Legislation 
Recommendation 1  
 The Committee recommends the inclusion of an objectives clause within the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which:  
 expresses the dual objectives of the legislation –  
 to protect the privacy of communications;  
 to enable interception and access to communications in order to 
investigate serious crime and threats to national security; and  
 accords with the privacy principles contained in the Privacy Act 1988.  
Recommendation 2  
 The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department undertake 
an examination of the proportionality tests within the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). Factors to be considered in the 
proportionality tests include the:  
 privacy impacts of proposed investigative activity;  
 public interest served by the proposed investigative activity, including 
the gravity of the conduct being investigated; and  
 availability and effectiveness of less privacy intrusive investigative 
techniques.  
 The Committee further recommends that the examination of the 
proportionality tests also consider the appropriateness of applying a consistent 
proportionality test across the interception, stored communications and access 
to telecommunications data powers in the TIA Act.  
Recommendation 3  
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 with a 
view to revising the reporting requirements to ensure that the information 
provided assists in the evaluation of whether the privacy intrusion was 
proportionate to the public outcome sought.  
Recommendation 4  
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake a review of the oversight arrangements to consider the appropriate 
98  
 
organisation or agency to ensure effective accountability under the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.  
 Further, the review should consider the scope of the role to be undertaken by 
the relevant oversight mechanism.  
 The Committee also recommends the Attorney-General’s Department consult 
with State and Territory ministers prior to progressing any proposed reforms 
to ensure jurisdictional considerations are addressed.  
Recommendation 5  
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department review 
the threshold for access to telecommunications data. This review should focus 
on reducing the number of agencies able to access telecommunications data 
by using gravity of conduct which may be investigated utilising 
telecommunications data as the threshold on which access is allowed.  
Recommendation 6  
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of 
communications. The standardisation should consider the:  
 privacy impact of the threshold;  
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy intrusion;  
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative means;  
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular threshold; 
and  
 impact on law enforcement agencies’ investigative capabilities, 
including those accessing stored communications when investigating 
pecuniary penalty offences.  
Recommendation 7  
 The Committee recommends that interception be conducted on the basis of 
specific attributes of communications.  
 The Committee further recommends that the Government model ‘attribute 
based interception’ on the existing named person interception warrants, which 
includes:  
 the ability for the issuing authority to set parameters around the variation 
of attributes for interception;  
 the ability for interception agencies to vary the attributes for 
interception; and  
 reporting on the attributes added for interception by an authorised officer 
within an interception agency.  
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 In addition to Parliamentary oversight, the Committee recommends that 
attribute based interception be subject to the following safeguards and 
accountability measures:  
 attribute based interception is only authorised when an issuing authority 
or approved officer is satisfied the facts and grounds indicate that 
interception is proportionate to the offence or national security threat 
being investigated;  
 oversight of attribute based interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and  
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of attribute based interception.  
Recommendation 8  
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department review 
the information sharing provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 to ensure:  
 protection of the security and privacy of intercepted information; and  
 sharing of information where necessary to facilitate investigation of 
serious crime or threats to national security.  
Recommendation 9  
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to remove legislative duplication. xxvi  
Recommendation 10  
 The Committee recommends that the telecommunications interception 
warrant provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 be revised to develop a single interception warrant regime.  
 The Committee recommends the single warrant regime include the following 
features:  
 a single threshold for law enforcement agencies to access 
communications based on serious criminal offences;  
 removal of the concept of stored communications to provide uniform 
protection to the content of communications; and  
 maintenance of the existing ability to apply for telephone applications 
for warrants, emergency warrants and ability to enter premises.  
 The Committee further recommends that the single warrant regime be subject 
to the following safeguards and accountability measures:  
 interception is only authorised when an issuing authority is satisfied the 
facts and grounds indicate that interception is proportionate to the 
offence or national security threat being investigated;  
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 rigorous oversight of interception by the ombudsmen and Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security;  
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of interception; and  
 Parliamentary oversight of the use of interception.  
Recommendation 11  
 The Committee recommends that the Government review the application of 
the interception-related industry assistance obligations contained in the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and 
Telecommunications Act 1997.  
Recommendation 12  
 The Committee recommends the Government consider expanding the 
regulatory enforcement options available to the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority to include a range of enforcement 
mechanisms in order to provide tools proportionate to the conduct being 
regulated.  
Recommendation 13  
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to include provisions which clearly express the 
scope of the obligations which require telecommunications providers to 
provide assistance to law enforcement and national security agencies 
regarding telecommunications interception and access to telecommunications 
data.  
Recommendation 14  
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access Act) 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to make 
it clear beyond doubt that the existing obligations of the telecommunications 
interception regime apply to all providers (including ancillary service 
providers) of telecommunications services accessed within Australia. As with 
the existing cost sharing arrangements, this should be done on a no-profit and 
no-loss basis for ancillary service providers.  
Recommendation 15  
 The Committee recommends that the Government should develop the 
implementation model on the basis of a uniformity of obligations while 
acknowledging that the creation of exemptions on the basis of practicability 
and affordability may be justifiable in particular cases. However, in all such 
cases the burden should lie on the industry participants to demonstrate why 
they should receive these exemptions.  
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Recommendation 16  
 The Committee recommends that, should the Government decide to develop 
an offence for failure to assist in decrypting communications, the offence be 
developed in consultation with the telecommunications industry, the 
Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy, and the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority. It is important that any 
such offence be expressed with sufficient specificity so that 
telecommunications providers are left with a clear understanding of their 
obligations.  
Recommendation 17  
 The Committee recommends that, if the Government decides to develop 
timelines for telecommunications industry assistance for law enforcement and 
national security agencies, the timelines should be developed in consultation 
with the investigative agencies, the telecommunications industry, the 
Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy, and the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority.  
 The Committee further recommends that, if the Government decides to 
develop mandatory timelines, the cost to the telecommunications industry 
must be considered.  
Recommendation 18  
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the objective of 
designing an interception regime which is underpinned by the following:  
 clear protection for the privacy of communications;  
 provisions which are technology neutral;  
 maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by provisions for 
appropriate use of intercepted information for lawful purposes;  
 clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and  
 robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative 
efficiency.  
 The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be 
undertaken in consultation with interested stakeholders, including privacy 
advocates and practitioners, oversight bodies, telecommunications providers, 
law enforcement and security agencies.  
 The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be released as 
an exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the Government should 
expressly seek the views of key agencies, including the:  
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor;  
 Australian Information Commissioner;  
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 ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.  
 In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the draft 
legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
Recommendation 42 
 There is a diversity of views within the Committee as to whether there should 
be a mandatory data retention regime. This is ultimately a decision for 
Government. If the Government is persuaded that a mandatory data retention 
regime should proceed, the Committee recommends that the Government 
publish an exposure draft of any legislation and refer it to the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for examination. Any draft 
legislation should include the following features: 
 any mandatory data retention regime should apply only to meta-data and 
exclude content; 
 the controls on access to communications data remain the same as under 
the current regime; 
 internet browsing data should be explicitly excluded; 
 where information includes content that cannot be separated from data, 
the information should be treated as content and therefore a warrant 
would be required for lawful access; 
 the data should be stored securely by making encryption mandatory; 
 save for existing provisions enabling agencies to retain data for a longer 
period of time, data retained under a new regime should be for longer 
period of time, data retained under a new regime should be for no more 
than two years; 
 the costs incurred by providers should be reimbursed by the 
Government; 
 a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme; 
 an independent audit function be established within an appropriate 
agency to ensure that communications content is not stored by 
telecommunications service providers; and 
 oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by the 
ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
Recommendation 43 
 The Committee recommends that, if the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed: 
 there should be a mechanism for oversight of the scheme by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; 
 there should be an annual report on the operation of this scheme 
presented to Parliament; and 
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 the effectiveness of the regime be reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security three years after its 
commencement. 
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Appendix 2 
Public submissions 
 
1 Australian Law Reform Commission  
2 Mr Brett Hedger  
3  Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC)  
4  Blueprint For Free Speech  
5  ThoughtWorks Australia Pty Ltd  
6  Victoria Police  
7  Australian Racing Board  
8  Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA)  
9  Commonwealth Ombudsman  
10  Pirate Party Australia  
11  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity  
12  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security  
13  NSW Ombudsman  
14  Corruption and Crime Commission  
15  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance  
16  Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association  
17  Public Interest Monitor (Victoria)  
18  Independent Commissioner Against Corruption  
19  Mr Johann Trevaskis  
20  Western Australia Police  
21 Northern Territory Police  
22  Electronic Frontiers Australia  
23  Australian Crime Commission  
24  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner  
25  Australian Federal Police (AFP)  
26  Attorney-General's Department   
27  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)   
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28  Information and Privacy Commission NSW (ipc) 
29  Mr Arthur Marsh  
30  NSW Government  
31  Confidential   
32  Name Withheld  
33  Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman  
34  Law Council of Australia  
35  Confidential   
36  The Australian Privacy Foundation  
37  Mr Philip Dorling  
38  iiNet Limited (PDF 399 KB)     
39  Office of the Inspector of the Independent Commission Against Corruption   
40  Guardian Australia  
41 Confidential   
42  NSW Council for Civil Liberties  
43  Confidential   
44  Civil Liberties Australia  
45  Free TV Australia 
  
Appendix 3 
Public hearings and witnesses 
Tuesday, 22 April 2014—Canberra 
COLVIN, Acting Commissioner Andrew, Australian Federal Police 
CRAWFORD, Assistant Commissioner Peter, Queensland Police Service 
JEVTOVIC, Mr Paul APM, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Australian Crime 
Commission 
JEVTOVIC, Mr Paul, APM, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Australian Crime 
Commission 
KELLY, Ms Wendy Anne, Director, Telecommunications and Surveillance Law 
Branch, Attorney-General's Department 
LIND, Ms Judith, Executive Director, Strategy and Specialist Capabilities, Australian 
Crime Commission 
MCMULLAN, Ms Kathryn, National Manager, Specialist Capabilities, Australian 
Crime Commission 
SMITH, Ms Catherine Lucy, Assistant Secretary, Telecommunications and 
Surveillance Law Branch, Attorney-General's Department 
STEVENS, Deputy Commissioner Grant John, Deputy Commissioner of Police, 
South Australia Police 
TANZER, Mr Greg, Commissioner, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 
WILKINS, Mr Roger, AO, Secretary, Attorney-General's Department 
WILLIAMS, Mr Gregory, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Taxation Office 
 
Wednesday, 23 April 2014—Canberra 
BAKER-GOLDSMITH, Ms Sarah, Principal Lawyer, Australian Commission for 
Law Enforcement Integrity 
BIBBY, Dr Martin, Member, Executive Committee, NSW Council for Civil Liberties 
BLANKS, Mr Stephen, President, NSW Council for Civil Liberties 
BLIGHT, Mr Jake, Assistant Inspector-General, Office of Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security 
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BOULTEN, Mr Phillip, SC, Member, National Criminal Law Committee, Law 
Council of Australia 
CLARK, Mr Nick, Education Coordinator, Rule of Law Institute of Australia 
CLARK, Ms Narelle, President, Internet Society of Australia 
MARSHALL, Ms Sarah, Acting Executive Director Operations, Australian 
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
McMILLAN, Professor John Denison, Australian Information Commissioner, Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner 
MOLT, Dr Natasha, Policy Lawyer, Criminal Law and Human Rights Division, Law 
Council of Australia 
MOSS, Mr Philip, Integrity Commissioner, Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity 
MOULDS, Ms Sarah, Acting Co-Director, Criminal Law and Human Rights Division, 
Law Council of Australia 
NEAVE, Mr Colin, Commonwealth Ombudsman 
POMERY, Mr Simon, Assistant Director, Commonwealth Ombudsman 
ROGERS, Mr Jackson, Assistant Secretary, NSW Council for Civil Liberties 
SELLARS, Mr Nicholas, Acting Executive Director Strategic and Secretariat, 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
STEWART, Mr Malcolm, Vice-President, Rule of Law Institute of Australia 
THOM, Dr Vivienne, Inspector-General, Office of Inspector-General of Intelligence 
and Security 
WOLFE, Mr Simon, Head of Research, Blueprint for Free Speech 
 
Monday, 21 July 2014—Canberra 
ARNOLD, Associate Professor Bruce Baer, Law School, University of Canberra 
HARTLAND, Ms Kerri, Deputy Director-General, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation 
IRVINE, Mr David Taylor, Director-General of Security, Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation 
WARREN, Mr Christopher, Federal Secretary, Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance 
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Tuesday, 29 July 2014—Sydney 
ALTHAUS, Mr Chris, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association 
BAKER, Mr Stewart Abercrombie, Private capacity 
DALBY, Mr Steve, Chief Regulatory Officer, iiNet Limited 
FROELICH, Mr Peter, Industry member, Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association and Communications Alliance Ltd 
KELLOW, Mr Philip John, Registrar, Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
LAWRENCE, Mr Jon, Executive Officer, Electronic Frontiers Australia 
O'DONNELL, Ms Leanne, Regulatory Manager, iiNet Limited 
RYAN, Mr Michael, Industry member, Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association and Communications Alliance Ltd 
STANTON, Mr John, Chief Executive Officer, Communications Alliance Ltd 
VULKANOVSKI, Mr Alexander, Member, Policy and Research Standing Committee 
WATERS, Mr Nigel, Australian Privacy Foundation 
YERRAMSETTI, Mr Roger, Operations Manager, iiNet Limited 
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Appendix 4 
Examples of telecommunications data generated by a 
website, a Facebook page and a tweet 
 
Source: Document tabled by iiNet Limited at public hearing on 29 July 2014  
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Appendix 5 
Tabled documents, answers to questions on notice and 
additional information 
 
Answers to questions on notice 
1 Attorney-General's Department - answers to questions taken on notice (received 
12 May 2014) 
2 iiNet Limited – answer to a question taken on notice at a public hearing on 
29 July 2014 (received 11 August 2014) 
 
 
 
Additional information 
1 Additional Information received from Geoff Taylor – Document 1 
2 Additional Information received from Geoff Taylor – Document 2 
3 Document tabled by the Australian Crime Commission at public hearing held 
22 April 2014 - Telecommunications Interception and Access Compliance 
4 Additional Information received from Geoff Taylor – Document 3 
5 Additional Information received from Geoff Taylor – Document 4 
6 Document tabled by iiNet Limited, at public hearing on 29 July 2014 
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Appendix 6 
 
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 March 2006 
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www.curia.europa.eu 
Press and Information 
    Court of Justice of the European Union  
PRESS RELEASE No 54/14 
Luxembourg, 8 April 2014 
Judgment in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others  
 
The Court of Justice declares the Data Retention Directive to be invalid 
It entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect 
for private life and to the protection of personal data, without that interference being limited to what 
is strictly necessary 
The main objective of the Data Retention Directive1 is to harmonise Member States’ provisions 
concerning the retention of certain data which are generated or processed by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks. It therefore 
seeks to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, such as, in particular, organised crime and terrorism. 
Thus, the directive provides that the abovementioned providers must retain traffic and location data 
as well as related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user. By contrast, it does not permit 
the retention of the content of the communication or of information consulted. 
The High Court (Ireland) and the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court, Austria) are asking 
the Court of Justice to examine the validity of the directive, in particular in the light of two 
fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, namely the fundamental 
right to respect for private life and the fundamental right to the protection of personal data. 
The High Court must resolve a dispute between the Irish company Digital Rights Ireland and the 
Irish authorities regarding the legality of national measures concerning the retention of data relating 
to electronic communications. The Verfassungsgerichtshof has before it several constitutional 
actions brought by the Kärntner Landesregierung (Government of the Province of Carinthia) and by 
Mr Seitlinger, Mr Tschohl and 11 128 other applicants. Those actions seek the annulment of the 
national provision which transposes the directive into Austrian law.       
By today’s judgment, the Court declares the directive invalid2. 
The Court observes first of all that the data to be retained make it possible, in particular, (1) to 
know the identity of the person with whom a subscriber or registered user has communicated and 
by what means, (2) to identify the time of the communication as well as the place from which that 
communication took place and (3) to know the frequency of the communications of the subscriber 
or registered user with certain persons during a given period. Those data, taken as a whole, may 
provide very precise information on the private lives of the persons whose data are retained, such 
as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other 
movements, activities carried out, social relationships and the social environments frequented. 
The Court takes the view that, by requiring the retention of those data and by allowing the 
competent national authorities to access those data, the directive interferes in a particularly 
serious manner with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection 
of personal data. Furthermore, the fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the 
                                                 
1
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of 
public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54). 
2
 Given that the Court has not limited the temporal effect of its judgment, the declaration of invalidity takes effect from the 
date on which the directive entered into force. 
www.curia.europa.eu 
subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to generate in the persons concerned a 
feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance.  
The Court then examines whether such an interference with the fundamental rights at issue is 
justified. 
It states that the retention of data required by the directive is not such as to adversely affect 
the essence of the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of 
personal data. The directive does not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the 
electronic communications as such and provides that service or network providers must respect 
certain principles of data protection and data security.  
Furthermore, the retention of data for the purpose of their possible transmission to the 
competent national authorities genuinely satisfies an objective of general interest, namely the 
fight against serious crime and, ultimately, public security. 
However, the Court is of the opinion that, by adopting the Data Retention Directive, the EU 
legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality. 
In that context, the Court observes that, in view of the important role played by the protection of 
personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect for private life and the extent and 
seriousness of the interference with that right caused by the directive, the EU legislature’s 
discretion is reduced, with the result that review of that discretion should be strict. 
Although the retention of data required by the directive may be considered to be appropriate for 
attaining the objective pursued by it, the wide-ranging and particularly serious interference of 
the directive with the fundamental rights at issue is not sufficiently circumscribed to ensure 
that that interference is actually limited to what is strictly necessary. 
Firstly, the directive covers, in a generalised manner, all individuals, all means of electronic 
communication and all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being 
made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime. 
Secondly, the directive fails to lay down any objective criterion which would ensure that the 
competent national authorities have access to the data and can use them only for the purposes of 
prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concerning offences that, in view of the extent and 
seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights in question, may be considered to be 
sufficiently serious to justify such an interference. On the contrary, the directive simply refers in a 
general manner to ‘serious crime’ as defined by each Member State in its national law. In addition, 
the directive does not lay down substantive and procedural conditions under which the competent 
national authorities may have access to the data and subsequently use them. In particular, the 
access to the data is not made dependent on the prior review by a court or by an independent 
administrative body.  
Thirdly, so far as concerns the data retention period, the directive imposes a period of at least six 
months, without making any distinction between the categories of data on the basis of the persons 
concerned or the possible usefulness of the data in relation to the objective pursued. Furthermore, 
that period is set at between a minimum of six months and a maximum of 24 months, but the 
directive does not state the objective criteria on the basis of which the period of retention must be 
determined in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary. 
The Court also finds that the directive does not provide for sufficient safeguards to ensure effective 
protection of the data against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of the 
data. It notes, inter alia, that the directive permits service providers to have regard to economic 
considerations when determining the level of security which they apply (particularly as regards the 
costs of implementing security measures) and that it does not ensure the irreversible destruction of 
the data at the end of their retention period.  
www.curia.europa.eu 
Lastly, the Court states that the directive does not require that the data be retained within the EU. 
Therefore, the directive does not fully ensure the control of compliance with the requirements of 
protection and security by an independent authority, as is, however, explicitly required by the 
Charter. Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. 
 
NOTE: A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in disputes 
which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the Court of Justice about the interpretation of 
European Union law or the validity of a European Union act. The Court of Justice does not decide the 
dispute itself. It is for the national court or tribunal to dispose of the case in accordance with the Court’s 
decision, which is similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised. 
 
Unofficial document for media use, not binding on the Court of Justice. 
The full text of the judgment is published on the CURIA website on the day of delivery.  
Press contact: Christopher Fretwell  (+352) 4303 3355 
Pictures of the delivery of the judgment are available from "Europe by Satellite"  (+32) 2 2964106 
 
 
 
DIRECTIVE 2006/24/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 15 March 2006
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Directive 2002/58/EC
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity, and in particular Article 95 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Economic and
Social Committee (1),
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251
of the Treaty (2),
Whereas:
(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individu-
als with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data (3) requires Member States
to protect the rights and freedoms of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data, and in particular
their right to privacy, in order to ensure the free flow of
personal data in the Community.
(2) Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and
electronic communications) (4) translates the principles set
out in Directive 95/46/EC into specific rules for the elec-
tronic communications sector.
(3) Articles 5, 6 and 9 of Directive 2002/58/EC lay down the
rules applicable to the processing by network and service
providers of traffic and location data generated by using
electronic communications services. Such data must be
erased or made anonymous when no longer needed for the
purpose of the transmission of a communication, except
for the data necessary for billing or interconnection pay-
ments. Subject to consent, certain data may also be pro-
cessed for marketing purposes and the provision of value-
added services.
(4) Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC sets out the condi-
tions under which Member States may restrict the scope of
the rights and obligations provided for in Article 5,
Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of that
Directive. Any such restrictions must be necessary, appro-
priate and proportionate within a democratic society for
specific public order purposes, i.e. to safeguard national
security (i.e. State security), defence, public security or the
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of
criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic
communications systems.
(5) Several Member States have adopted legislation providing
for the retention of data by service providers for the pre-
vention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of crimi-
nal offences. Those national provisions vary considerably.
(6) The legal and technical differences between national pro-
visions concerning the retention of data for the purpose of
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of
criminal offences present obstacles to the internal market
for electronic communications, since service providers are
faced with different requirements regarding the types of
traffic and location data to be retained and the conditions
and periods of retention.
(7) The Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council
of 19 December 2002 underline that, because of the sig-
nificant growth in the possibilities afforded by electronic
communications, data relating to the use of electronic
communications are particularly important and therefore
a valuable tool in the prevention, investigation, detection
and prosecution of criminal offences, in particular organ-
ised crime.
(8) The Declaration on Combating Terrorism adopted by the
European Council on 25 March 2004 instructed the Coun-
cil to examine measures for establishing rules on the reten-
tion of communications traffic data by service providers.
(1) Opinion delivered on 19 January 2006 (not yet published in the Offi-
cial Journal).
(2) Opinion of the European Parliament of 14 December 2005 (not yet
published in the Official Journal) and Council Decision of 21 February
2006.
(3) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. Directive as amended by Regulation (EC)
No 1882/2003 (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1).
(4) OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37.
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(9) Under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR), everyone has the right to respect for his private life
and his correspondence. Public authorities may interfere
with the exercise of that right only in accordance with the
law and where necessary in a democratic society, inter alia,
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. Because retention of
data has proved to be such a necessary and effective inves-
tigative tool for law enforcement in several Member States,
and in particular concerning serious matters such as orga-
nised crime and terrorism, it is necessary to ensure that
retained data are made available to law enforcement
authorities for a certain period, subject to the conditions
provided for in this Directive. The adoption of an instru-
ment on data retention that complies with the require-
ments of Article 8 of the ECHR is therefore a necessary
measure.
(10) On 13 July 2005, the Council reaffirmed in its declaration
condemning the terrorist attacks on London the need to
adopt common measures on the retention of telecommu-
nications data as soon as possible.
(11) Given the importance of traffic and location data for the
investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal
offences, as demonstrated by research and the practical
experience of several Member States, there is a need to
ensure at European level that data that are generated or
processed, in the course of the supply of communications
services, by providers of publicly available electronic com-
munications services or of a public communications net-
work are retained for a certain period, subject to the
conditions provided for in this Directive.
(12) Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC continues to apply
to data, including data relating to unsuccessful call
attempts, the retention of which is not specifically required
under this Directive and which therefore fall outside the
scope thereof, and to retention for purposes, including
judicial purposes, other than those covered by this
Directive.
(13) This Directive relates only to data generated or processed
as a consequence of a communication or a communication
service and does not relate to data that are the content of
the information communicated. Data should be retained in
such a way as to avoid their being retained more than
once. Data generated or processed when supplying the
communications services concerned refers to data which
are accessible. In particular, as regards the retention of data
relating to Internet e-mail and Internet telephony, the obli-
gation to retain data may apply only in respect of data
from the providers’ or the network providers’ own services.
(14) Technologies relating to electronic communications are
changing rapidly and the legitimate requirements of the
competent authorities may evolve. In order to obtain
advice and encourage the sharing of experience of best
practice in these matters, the Commission intends to estab-
lish a group composed of Member States’ law enforcement
authorities, associations of the electronic communications
industry, representatives of the European Parliament and
data protection authorities, including the European Data
Protection Supervisor.
(15) Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC are fully
applicable to the data retained in accordance with this
Directive. Article 30(1)(c) of Directive 95/46/EC requires
the consultation of the Working Party on the Protection of
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data
established under Article 29 of that Directive.
(16) The obligations incumbent on service providers concern-
ing measures to ensure data quality, which derive from
Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC, and their obligations con-
cerning measures to ensure confidentiality and security of
processing of data, which derive from Articles 16 and 17
of that Directive, apply in full to data being retained within
the meaning of this Directive.
(17) It is essential that Member States adopt legislative measures
to ensure that data retained under this Directive are pro-
vided to the competent national authorities only in accor-
dance with national legislation in full respect of the
fundamental rights of the persons concerned.
(18) In this context, Article 24 of Directive 95/46/EC imposes
an obligation on Member States to lay down sanctions for
infringements of the provisions adopted pursuant to that
Directive. Article 15(2) of Directive 2002/58/EC imposes
the same requirement in relation to national provisions
adopted pursuant to Directive 2002/58/EC. Council
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005
on attacks against information systems (1) provides that
the intentional illegal access to information systems,
including to data retained therein, is to be made punish-
able as a criminal offence.
(19) The right of any person who has suffered damage as a
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act
incompatible with national provisions adopted pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC to receive compensation, which derives
from Article 23 of that Directive, applies also in relation to
the unlawful processing of any personal data pursuant to
this Directive.
(1) OJ L 69, 16.3.2005, p. 67.
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(20) The 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
and the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Pro-
tection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data also cover data being retained within
the meaning of this Directive.
(21) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to harmonise
the obligations on providers to retain certain data and to
ensure that those data are available for the purpose of the
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime,
as defined by each Member State in its national law, can-
not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of this Direc-
tive, be better achieved at Community level, the Commu-
nity may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accor-
dance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in
that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is nec-
essary in order to achieve those objectives.
(22) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes
the principles recognised, in particular, by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In particular,
this Directive, together with Directive 2002/58/EC, seeks
to ensure full compliance with citizens’ fundamental rights
to respect for private life and communications and to the
protection of their personal data, as enshrined in Articles 7
and 8 of the Charter.
(23) Given that the obligations on providers of electronic com-
munications services should be proportionate, this Direc-
tive requires that they retain only such data as are generated
or processed in the process of supplying their communi-
cations services. To the extent that such data are not gen-
erated or processed by those providers, there is no
obligation to retain them. This Directive is not intended to
harmonise the technology for retaining data, the choice of
which is a matter to be resolved at national level.
(24) In accordance with paragraph 34 of the Interinstitutional
agreement on better law-making (1), Member States are
encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests
of the Community, their own tables illustrating, as far as
possible, the correlation between this Directive and the
transposition measures, and to make them public.
(25) This Directive is without prejudice to the power of Mem-
ber States to adopt legislative measures concerning the
right of access to, and use of, data by national authorities,
as designated by them. Issues of access to data retained
pursuant to this Directive by national authorities for such
activities as are referred to in the first indent of Article 3(2)
of Directive 95/46/EC fall outside the scope of Community
law. However, they may be subject to national law or
action pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European
Union. Such laws or action must fully respect fundamen-
tal rights as they result from the common constitutional
traditions of the Member States and as guaranteed by the
ECHR. Under Article 8 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights, interference by public
authorities with privacy rights must meet the requirements
of necessity and proportionality and must therefore serve
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and be exercised
in a manner that is adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purpose of the interference,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
Subject matter and scope
1. This Directive aims to harmonise Member States’ provisions
concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications
networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are
generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data
are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and
prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in
its national law.
2. This Directive shall apply to traffic and location data on
both legal entities and natural persons and to the related data nec-
essary to identify the subscriber or registered user. It shall not
apply to the content of electronic communications, including
information consulted using an electronic communications
network.
Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purpose of this Directive, the definitions in Direc-
tive 95/46/EC, in Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services (Framework Directive) (2), and in Directive
2002/58/EC shall apply.
2. For the purpose of this Directive:
(a) ‘data’ means traffic data and location data and the related data
necessary to identify the subscriber or user;
(1) OJ C 321, 31.12.2003, p. 1. (2) OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33.
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(b) ‘user’ means any legal entity or natural person using a pub-
licly available electronic communications service, for private
or business purposes, without necessarily having subscribed
to that service;
(c) ‘telephone service’ means calls (including voice, voicemail
and conference and data calls), supplementary services
(including call forwarding and call transfer) and messaging
and multi-media services (including short message services,
enhanced media services and multi-media services);
(d) ‘user ID’ means a unique identifier allocated to persons when
they subscribe to or register with an Internet access service
or Internet communications service;
(e) ‘cell ID’ means the identity of the cell from which a mobile
telephony call originated or in which it terminated;
(f) ‘unsuccessful call attempt’ means a communication where a
telephone call has been successfully connected but not
answered or there has been a network management
intervention.
Article 3
Obligation to retain data
1. By way of derogation from Articles 5, 6 and 9 of Directive
2002/58/EC, Member States shall adopt measures to ensure that
the data specified in Article 5 of this Directive are retained in
accordance with the provisions thereof, to the extent that those
data are generated or processed by providers of publicly available
electronic communications services or of a public communica-
tions network within their jurisdiction in the process of supply-
ing the communications services concerned.
2. The obligation to retain data provided for in paragraph 1
shall include the retention of the data specified in Article 5 relat-
ing to unsuccessful call attempts where those data are generated
or processed, and stored (as regards telephony data) or logged (as
regards Internet data), by providers of publicly available electronic
communications services or of a public communications network
within the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned in the pro-
cess of supplying the communication services concerned. This
Directive shall not require data relating to unconnected calls to be
retained.
Article 4
Access to data
Member States shall adopt measures to ensure that data retained
in accordance with this Directive are provided only to the com-
petent national authorities in specific cases and in accordance
with national law. The procedures to be followed and the condi-
tions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to retained data in
accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements shall
be defined by each Member State in its national law, subject to the
relevant provisions of European Union law or public international
law, and in particular the ECHR as interpreted by the European
Court of Human Rights.
Article 5
Categories of data to be retained
1. Member States shall ensure that the following categories of
data are retained under this Directive:
(a) data necessary to trace and identify the source of a
communication:
(1) concerning fixed network telephony and mobile
telephony:
(i) the calling telephone number;
(ii) the name and address of the subscriber or registered
user;
(2) concerning Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet
telephony:
(i) the user ID(s) allocated;
(ii) the user ID and telephone number allocated to any
communication entering the public telephone
network;
(iii) the name and address of the subscriber or registered
user to whom an Internet Protocol (IP) address, user
ID or telephone number was allocated at the time of
the communication;
(b) data necessary to identify the destination of a
communication:
(1) concerning fixed network telephony and mobile
telephony:
(i) the number(s) dialled (the telephone number(s)
called), and, in cases involving supplementary ser-
vices such as call forwarding or call transfer, the
number or numbers to which the call is routed;
(ii) the name(s) and address(es) of the subscriber(s) or
registered user(s);
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(2) concerning Internet e-mail and Internet telephony:
(i) the user ID or telephone number of the intended
recipient(s) of an Internet telephony call;
(ii) the name(s) and address(es) of the subscriber(s) or
registered user(s) and user ID of the intended recipi-
ent of the communication;
(c) data necessary to identify the date, time and duration of a
communication:
(1) concerning fixed network telephony and mobile tele-
phony, the date and time of the start and end of the
communication;
(2) concerning Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet
telephony:
(i) the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the
Internet access service, based on a certain time zone,
together with the IP address, whether dynamic or
static, allocated by the Internet access service pro-
vider to a communication, and the user ID of the
subscriber or registered user;
(ii) the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the
Internet e-mail service or Internet telephony service,
based on a certain time zone;
(d) data necessary to identify the type of communication:
(1) concerning fixed network telephony and mobile tele-
phony: the telephone service used;
(2) concerning Internet e-mail and Internet telephony: the
Internet service used;
(e) data necessary to identify users’ communication equipment
or what purports to be their equipment:
(1) concerning fixed network telephony, the calling
and called telephone numbers;
(2) concerning mobile telephony:
(i) the calling and called telephone numbers;
(ii) the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
of the calling party;
(iii) the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
of the calling party;
(iv) the IMSI of the called party;
(v) the IMEI of the called party;
(vi) in the case of pre-paid anonymous services, the date
and time of the initial activation of the service and
the location label (Cell ID) from which the service
was activated;
(3) concerning Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet
telephony:
(i) the calling telephone number for dial-up access;
(ii) the digital subscriber line (DSL) or other end point
of the originator of the communication;
(f) data necessary to identify the location of mobile communi-
cation equipment:
(1) the location label (Cell ID) at the start of the
communication;
(2) data identifying the geographic location of cells by ref-
erence to their location labels (Cell ID) during the period
for which communications data are retained.
2. No data revealing the content of the communication may be
retained pursuant to this Directive.
Article 6
Periods of retention
Member States shall ensure that the categories of data specified in
Article 5 are retained for periods of not less than six months and
not more than two years from the date of the communication.
Article 7
Data protection and data security
Without prejudice to the provisions adopted pursuant to Direc-
tive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC, eachMember State shall
ensure that providers of publicly available electronic communi-
cations services or of a public communications network respect,
as a minimum, the following data security principles with respect
to data retained in accordance with this Directive:
(a) the retained data shall be of the same quality and subject to
the same security and protection as those data on the
network;
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(b) the data shall be subject to appropriate technical and organi-
sational measures to protect the data against accidental or
unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or unau-
thorised or unlawful storage, processing, access or disclosure;
(c) the data shall be subject to appropriate technical and organi-
sational measures to ensure that they can be accessed by spe-
cially authorised personnel only;
and
(d) the data, except those that have been accessed and preserved,
shall be destroyed at the end of the period of retention.
Article 8
Storage requirements for retained data
Member States shall ensure that the data specified in Article 5 are
retained in accordance with this Directive in such a way that the
data retained and any other necessary information relating to such
data can be transmitted upon request to the competent authori-
ties without undue delay.
Article 9
Supervisory authority
1. Each Member State shall designate one or more public
authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application
within its territory of the provisions adopted by the Member
States pursuant to Article 7 regarding the security of the stored
data. Those authorities may be the same authorities as those
referred to in Article 28 of Directive 95/46/EC.
2. The authorities referred to in paragraph 1 shall act with
complete independence in carrying out the monitoring referred
to in that paragraph.
Article 10
Statistics
1. Member States shall ensure that the Commission is provided
on a yearly basis with statistics on the retention of data generated
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly avail-
able electronic communications services or a public communica-
tions network. Such statistics shall include:
— the cases in which information was provided to the compe-
tent authorities in accordance with applicable national law,
— the time elapsed between the date on which the data were
retained and the date on which the competent authority
requested the transmission of the data,
— the cases where requests for data could not be met.
2. Such statistics shall not contain personal data.
Article 11
Amendment of Directive 2002/58/EC
The following paragraph shall be inserted in Article 15 of Direc-
tive 2002/58/EC:
‘1a. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to data specifically required
by Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data gen-
erated or processed in connection with the provision of pub-
licly available electronic communications services or of public
communications networks (*) to be retained for the purposes
referred to in Article 1(1) of that Directive.
(*) OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 54.’
Aricle 12
Future measures
1. A Member State facing particular circumstances that war-
rant an extension for a limited period of the maximum retention
period referred to in Article 6 may take the necessary measures.
That Member State shall immediately notify the Commission
and inform the other Member States of the measures taken under
this Article and shall state the grounds for introducing them.
2. The Commission shall, within a period of six months after
the notification referred to in paragraph 1, approve or reject the
national measures concerned, after having examined whether
they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion of trade between Member States and whether they constitute
an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. In the
absence of a decision by the Commission within that period the
national measures shall be deemed to have been approved.
3. Where, pursuant to paragraph 2, the national measures of a
Member State derogating from the provisions of this Directive are
approved, the Commission may consider whether to propose an
amendment to this Directive.
Article 13
Remedies, liability and penalties
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that the national measures implementing Chapter III of
Directive 95/46/EC providing for judicial remedies, liability and
sanctions are fully implemented with respect to the processing of
data under this Directive.
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2. Each Member State shall, in particular, take the necessary
measures to ensure that any intentional access to, or transfer of,
data retained in accordance with this Directive that is not permit-
ted under national law adopted pursuant to this Directive is pun-
ishable by penalties, including administrative or criminal
penalties, that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
Article 14
Evaluation
1. No later than 15 September 2010, the Commission shall
submit to the European Parliament and the Council an evaluation
of the application of this Directive and its impact on economic
operators and consumers, taking into account further develop-
ments in electronic communications technology and the statis-
tics provided to the Commission pursuant to Article 10 with a
view to determining whether it is necessary to amend the provi-
sions of this Directive, in particular with regard to the list of data
in Article 5 and the periods of retention provided for in Article 6.
The results of the evaluation shall be made public.
2. To that end, the Commission shall examine all observations
communicated to it by the Member States or by the Working
Party established under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC.
Article 15
Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by no later than 15 September 2007. They shall forth-
with inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt
those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or
shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their
official publication. The methods of making such reference shall
be laid down by Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in
the field covered by this Directive.
3. Until 15 March 2009, each Member State may postpone
application of this Directive to the retention of communications
data relating to Internet Access, Internet telephony and Internet
e-mail. Any Member State that intends to make use of this para-
graph shall, upon adoption of this Directive, notify the Council
and the Commission to that effect by way of a declaration. The
declaration shall be published in the Official Journal of the European
Union.
Article 16
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day follow-
ing that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union.
Article 17
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Strasbourg, 15 March 2006.
For the European Parliament
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES
For the Council
The President
H. WINKLER
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Declaration by the Netherlands
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Regarding the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provi-
sion of publicly available electronic communications services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, the Netherlands will be making use of
the option of postponing application of the Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access, Internet tele-
phony and Internet e-mail, for a period not exceeding 18 months following the date of entry into force of the Directive.
Declaration by Austria
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Austria declares that it will be postponing application of this Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access,
Internet telephony and Internet e-mail, for a period of 18 months following the date specified in Article 15(1).
Declaration by Estonia
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
In accordance with Article 15(3) of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, Estonia hereby states its intention to make use of use that paragraph and to postpone
application of the Directive to retention of communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail until
36 months after the date of adoption of the Directive.
Declaration by the United Kingdom
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
The United Kingdom declares in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Directive on the retention of data generated or processed in con-
nection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amend-
ing Directive 2002/58/EC that it will postpone application of that Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet
access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail.
Declaration by the Republic of Cyprus
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
The Republic of Cyprus declares that it is postponing application of the Directive in respect of the retention of communications data
relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail until the date fixed in Article 15(3).
Declaration by the Hellenic Republic
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Greece declares that, pursuant to Article 15(3), it will postpone application of this Directive in respect of the retention of communications
data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail until 18 months after expiry of the period provided for in
Article 15(1).
Declaration by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data generated or processed
in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg declares that it intends to make use of Article 15(3)
of the Directive in order to have the option of postponing application of the Directive to the retention of communications data relating
to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail.
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Declaration by Slovenia
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Slovenia is joining the group of Member States which have made a declaration under Article 15(3) of the Directive of the European Par-
liament and the Council on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks, for the 18 months postponement of the application of the Directive to
the retention of communication data relating to Internet, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail.
Declaration by Sweden
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Pursuant to Article 15(3), Sweden wishes to have the option of postponing application of this Directive to the retention of communica-
tions data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail.
Declaration by the Republic of Lithuania
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data generated or pro-
cessed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC (hereafter the ‘Directive’), the Republic of Lithuania declares that once the Directive has been adopted it
will postpone the application thereof to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet
e-mail for the period provided for in Article 15(3).
Declaration by the Republic of Latvia
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Latvia states in accordance with Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed
in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC that it is postponing application of the Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Inter-
net access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail until 15 March 2009.
Declaration by the Czech Republic
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Pursuant to Article 15(3), the Czech Republic hereby declares that it is postponing application of this Directive to the retention of com-
munications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail until 36 months after the date of adoption thereof.
Declaration by Belgium
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Belgium declares that, taking up the option available under Article 15(3), it will postpone application of this Directive, for a period of
36 months after its adoption, to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail.
Declaration by the Republic of Poland
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Poland hereby declares that it intends to make use of the option provided for under Article 15(3) of the Directive of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic commu-
nications services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC and postpone application of the Directive to the retention of communications data
relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail for a period of 18 months following the date specified in Article 15(1).
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Declaration by Finland
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Finland declares in accordance with Article 15(3) of the Directive on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC that it will postpone application of that Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access, Inter-
net telephony and Internet e-mail.
Declaration by Germany
pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Germany reserves the right to postpone application of this Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet access,
Internet telephony and Internet e-mail for a period of 18 months following the date specified in the first sentence of Article 15(1).
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